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NOTE
BEYOND SEX DISCRIMINATION:
A PROPOSAL FOR FEDERAL SEXUAL
HARASSMENT LEGISLATION
Deborah N. McFarland*

"Yet as we look at how far we have come... we see also how far we
have yet to go."'
INTRODUCTION

For several months, a female worker has been subjected to a stream
of offensive sexual conduct from a male co-worker. Everyday, upon
arriving at work, she is met with questions and speculation about
when she last "got it," what sexual acts she has performed, and
whether she performed those acts with the boss. Furthermore, her
coworker physically assaults her, grabbing various parts of her body
whenever possible. On several occasions, the coworker has propositioned her in front of other coworkers, taunting her to "have sex with
me; you know you want it."
Presumably, no individual should be subjected to this type of offensive behavior in the workplace. In fact, Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 ("Title VII") 2 prohibits such harassment. This statutory
protection from abusive sexual conduct, however, is conditional-the
sex3 and sexual orientation of both the harasser and the victim determine whether there is protection under Title VII. 4 For instance, under
the specific circumstances described above, the conduct presents a
clear cause of action under Title VII5 because the woman was
harassed by a male who presumably would not direct such conduct
towards another man.6
* Many thanks to my family, whose continued support has made everything possible. In addition, I would like to thank Professor Tracy Higgins for her valuable
insight during the writing of this Note.
1. 140 Cong. Rec. E1311 (daily ed. June 23, 1994) (statement of Rep. Studds).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
3. The meaning of "sex" under Title VII has been debated since the statute's
enactment. Generally, however, courts use the term interchangeably with gender and
have construed both terms to mean "male" or "female." See infra part IIA (noting
the judiciary's narrow construction of sex under Title VII).
4. See infra part HI (discussing various forms of sexual harassment that are not
considered discrimination based on sex, and therefore not covered by Title VII, because of either the sexes or sexual orientations of the parties).
5. This assumes that the plaintiff would also meet the other requirements for a
Title VII sexual harassment claim. See infra note 104 (listing the requirements for a
claim of sexual harassment under Title VII).
6. The victim of such conduct might have a cause of action under "hostile work
environment" sexual harassment. See infra note 104 (discussing hostile work environ-
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If the harasser victimizes a member of the same sex, however, the
victim's access to relief is less certain. Whether an individual subjected to such harassment by a member of the same sex would be
entitled to relief would depend on the jurisdiction in which he or she is
located. 7 In addition, the viability of a cause of action in this context
often depends on the homosexuality of the harasser. 8 Even then,
ment sexual harassment, which involves sexual conduct that alters the work environment). In analyzing a claim of hostile work environment sexual harassment, the
Eleventh Circuit, in Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982), stated:
In the typical case in which a male supervisor makes sexual overtures to a
female worker, it is obvious that the supervisor did not treat male employees
in a similar fashion. It will therefore be a simple matter for the plaintiff to
prove that but for her sex, she would not have been subjected to sexual
harassment.
Id. at 904. Under the same reasoning, courts have accepted claims of reverse harassment where a female harasses a male. See infra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing the expansion of Title VII to include claims of reverse sexual harassment).
Cases of opposite-sex harassment illustrate that sexuality-both "gender status" and
sexual behavior-is inextricably tied to sexual harassment. Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case for Sex Discrimination 182 (1979)
(defining women's sexuality as being comprised of both "secondary sex characteristics
and sex-role behavior"). Courts premise sex discrimination in these cases on the presumption that a male harassing a female is doing so out of attraction, and thus would
not treat a male in the same manner. Discrimination is therefore established because
men and women are treated differently. See infra text accompanying notes 94-97 (discussing the "differences" approach utilized by courts in discrimination cases). As a
result of this presumption, however, the sexual orientation of the harasser becomes
determinative: the harasser's attraction to the victim underlies the presumption that
the victim was harassed because of his or her sex.
7. To date, only the Fourth Circuit, in Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77
F.3d 745 (4th Cir. 1996), and the Fifth Circuit, in Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28
F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994), have addressed the issue. Although the Fourth Circuit found
that the conduct at issue did not rise to the level of sexual harassment under Title VII,
the court recognized the viability of same-sex sexual harassment under Title VII.
Baltimore Gas, 77 F.3d at 752. The Fifth Circuit, however, held that Title VII does
not cover same-sex sexual harassment. Garcia,28 F.3d at 452. Even though other
circuits have not decided the issue, several circuits have indicated that such conduct
would be actionable under Title VII. See, e.g., Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d
428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995) (commenting that, although male-female harassment is the
most common form of sexual harassment, there is a possibility that female-male harassment or same-sex harassment would be actionable under Title VII); Steiner v.
Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994) (recognizing the possibility that both men and women might have a cause of action for sexual harassment
against their employer), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 733 (1995); Saulpaugh v. Monroe
Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 148 (2d Cir. 1993) (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring)
("[Hjarassment is harassment regardless of whether it is caused by a member of the
same or opposite sex."), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1165 (1994); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d
983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (acknowledging that harassment by a homosexual of
the same sex as the victim may constitute sexual harassment under Title VII). For a
fuller discussion of same-sex sexual harassment and the underlying theories that
courts have used when determining these cases, see infra part III.A.
8. See infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text. But see infra notes 117-22 and
accompanying text (presenting cases that do not require that the harasser be
homosexual).
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however, some courts have found same-sex sexual harassment

unactionable. 9

In addition, if the harasser victimizes members of both sexes, there

is, at most, questionable protection under Title VII.O For instance, if
a bisexual directed harassment identical to that described above at
both men and women, the behavior would fall outside the protection
of Title VII." Because men and women would be treated equally,
there would
be no discrimination based on sex despite abusive
2
treatment.1
Protection under Title VII also would be uncertain if a heterosexual
directed the same conduct at both men and women. 13 In this case, the
conduct presumably is directed at the women with a different purpose
or intent than that directed at the men. Toward the women, the harasser may act out of attraction, or with the intent of demeaning the
women because they are women. The conduct directed at the men,
however, attacks their manhood and demeans them for failing to fit
into a certain stereotype of masculinity. In at least one case such behavior has been found actionable under Title VII due to the different
nature of the conduct directed at the men and the women. 4 Because
the reasoning used to reach this result involved a strained interpreta-

tion of Title VII analysis, however, future protection of such claims is
questionable.' 5
Finally, if the behavior described above were directed at an individual because of that individual's sexual orientation, there would be no
9. See infra note 137 and accompanying text (citing cases that have found samesex sexual harassment unactionable under Title VII).
10. See infra parts II.B, III.C (discussing forms of harassment in which both men
and women are harassed).
11. See infra notes 162-76 and accompanying text. Bisexual harassment circumvents the premise of opposite-sex and homosexual same-sex harassment-that because of his or her sexual orientation, the harasser would victimize members of one
sex to the exclusion of members of the other sex. In the case of the bisexual harasser,
both men and women are treated equally, albeit poorly, and the harassment falls beyond the scope of Title VII.
12. See infra part II.B (discussing the "but-for" requirement as an element of Title
VII analysis that determines whether there was discrimination based on sex).
13. This conduct has been termed "equal opportunity harassment." See infra note
174 (comparing an equal opportunity harasser to a bisexual harasser). For example,
an equal opportunity harasser might direct comments at male employees that question their manhood with the intent to demean them. To the women, however, he
might direct sexual propositions and describe sexual acts he wishes to perform with
them. Although all of the employees are subjected to abusive conduct of a sexual
nature, the conduct is qualitatively different, and therefore possibly motivated by gender in each case. See infra part MI.C (discussing the viability of equal opportunity
harassment under Title VII and a recent case addressing the issue).
14. Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Wyo. 1993). The
court in Chiapuzio focused on the different types of comments and behavior that the
harasser directed at both the men and the women, and determined that the different
nature of the conduct satisfied the "but-for" requirement in each case. Id. at 1338; see
infra notes 186-90 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the unstable reasoning in Chiapuzio, see infra part Ifl.C.
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protection under Title VII. 16 Despite persuasive arguments that an
individual's sexual orientation is intimately tied to his or her gender
and therefore falls within "sex,"' 7 courts have refused to interpret the

term in a liberal manner.'"
The above hypothetical illustrates that some forms of sexual harassment, although harmful and abusive, do not constitute sex discrimination, and thus fall outside of Title VII's protection, often as a result of
the harasser's sex and/or sexual orientation.' 9 Although Title VII has
developed into a broad and effective means of protection from sexual
harassment for women, a number of individuals remain unprotected
from the 2abusive
treatment to which they are subjected in the
0
workplace.
Accordingly, an alternate cause of action must be created for those
forms of harassment that do not fit within the paradigm of sexual harassment as sex discrimination. 2 ' Congress should enact federal sexual
harassment legislation that focuses on sexual harassment per se-unreasonable sexual conduct in the workplace-rather than sexual harassment as a subset of sex discrimination. 22 A federal statute should
follow the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC"
or "Commission") 23 Guidelines on sexual harassment, focusing on the
nature of the harassment, rather than the genders or sexual orientations of the parties. Such legislation should emphasize the content of
the harassment and its effect on the victim and the victim's work
environment.
Part I of this Note discusses the history of Title VII, including the
political movement leading to the inclusion of "sex" within the statute.
16. See infra notes 202-16 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Samuel A. Marcosson, Harassmenton the Basis of Sexual Orientation:
A Claim of Sex DiscriminationUnder Title VII, 81 Geo. L.J. 1, 24-25 (1992) (asserting

that harassment based on sexual orientation violates Title VII because it is based on
stereotypes of the proper sexual roles for men and women).
18. See infra part II.A (discussing the courts' narrow construction of "sex").

19. See Susan P. Woodhouse, Comment, Same-Gender Sexual Harassment: Is It
Sex DiscriminationUnder Title VII?, 36 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1147, 1176 (1996). Wood-

house notes that if the courts follow the case law barring protection from same-sex
sexual harassment under Title VII, "then heterosexual males harassed by homosexual
males because of their sex will not be protected, even though the circumstances are
similar to when a female is harassed by a male." Id. (footnotes omitted). In addition,
the rationale potentially creates an opportunity for a defendant to escape liability by
stating that the harassment was motivated by his or her perception of the victim's
homosexuality, just as a harasser can cover his or her tracks by harassing members of
both sexes, thereby becoming an "equal opportunity harasser." See Ellen F. Paul,
Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm, 8 Yale L. & Pol'y

Rev. 333, 352 (1990) ("A savvy harasser need only note this anomaly and become an
equal opportunity harasser.").
20. See infra parts III.A.2, III.B, III.D.

21. See infra notes 91-101 and accompanying text (summarizing Catharine MacKinnon's theory of sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination).
22. See infra part IV.

23. See infra note 129 (outlining the EEOC's role in Title VII actions).
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In addition, part I notes that although the feminist movement's emphasis on the subordination of women to men initially resulted in a
broader interpretation of Title VII, courts today are unwilling to incorporate a more expansive definition of "sex" into the statute. Part
II explores the development of sex discrimination under Title VII,
particularly the theoretical construction of sexual harassment as a
form of sex discrimination. Furthermore, part II highlights the expansion of Title VII to include "reverse harassment" and sexual favoritism. Part III then summarizes the disagreement within the judiciary
regarding same-sex sexual harassment. Additionally, part III analyzes
the judiciary's approach to the situation of a bisexual harasser, as well
as a recent case allowing a claim of "equal opportunity harassment."
Finally, part III notes the exclusion of harassment based on sexual
orientation from the protection of Title VII. Part IV sets forth a proposition for federal sexual harassment legislation that focuses more
broadly on sexual harassment as wrongful conduct in the workplace
rather than as a form of discrimination. Part IV suggests that federal
sexual harassment legislation should track the EEOC Guidelines, focusing on the nature of the conduct and the effect on the victim's work
environment. In addition, part IV discusses the evaluation of sexual
harassment claims under the proposed legislation through a reconfiguration of the current standards for sexual harassment claims. This
Note concludes that federal sexual harassment legislation should be
enacted to address those forms of sexual harassment that do not fall
under Title VIl's proscription on discrimination because of sex. Because not all forms of sexual harassment constitute sex discrimination,
federal sexual harassment legislation should focus on sexual harassment per se, emphasizing the sexual conduct involved and the effect of
such conduct on the victim, while leaving intact the sex discrimination
construct which has provided extensive protection for women in the
workplace.
I.

HISTORY OF TrriLE VII

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted to provide
individuals with work "environment[s] free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult" 4 based on race,25 religion, 6 national
24. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
25. See, e.g., Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506,
514-15 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding that segregated eating arrangements resulting from
the exclusion of African-American firefighters from informal "supper clubs" was
"highly offensive" and violated Title VII); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, E., 545 F.2d 169,

176 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (finding that the defendant's discriminatory hiring practice
against African-Americans, as well as the employer's arbitrary discipline and discriminatory treatment of those African-Americans who were hired, violated Title VII).
26. See, e.g., Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157, 158, 160-61 (S.D. Ohio
1976) (finding that, where a supervisor referred to an employee as "Jew-boy," "the
kike," "the Christ-killer," "the damn Jew," and "the goddamn Jew," such conduct was
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origin,2 7 or sex. 28 To achieve such an end, the statute makes it
an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
[or her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his [or her] employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his [or her] status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.29
Although Title VII initially was aimed at ending discrimination
against African-Americans,3 ° Congress ultimately drafted Title VII
with the broad purpose of eradicating all forms of workplace discrimination.3 1 Accordingly, protection under the statute extends to all
because of the employee's religious beliefs and altered the conditions of employment

in contravention of Title VII).
27. See, e.g., Amirmokri v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 60 F.3d 1126, 1129, 1132
(4th Cir. 1995) (reversing grant of defendant's summary judgment motion on national
origin harassment claim where the employer called the Iranian plaintiff "the local
terrorist," a "camel jockey," "the ayatollah," and "the Emir of Waldorf' and withheld
job benefits).
28. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 19, 21-23 (1993) (holding that
the plaintiff had a cause of action under Title VII where a supervisor often insulted a
female employee because of her sex, suggested going to a hotel to negotiate her raise,
referred to the plaintiff as a "dumb ass woman," and made other sexual innuendos
about the plaintiff and other female employees); Meritor,477 U.S. at 60 (recognizing a
claim of hostile work environment sexual harassment where the female plaintiff
agreed to sexual relations with her supervisor out of fear of losing her job, and her
supervisor repeatedly demanded sexual favors, fondled the plaintiff in front of other
employees, exposed himself to her, and raped her on several occasions).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994). Title VII's coverage is fairly broad and applies
to "(1) employers having 15 or more employees in industries affecting commerce; (2)
state and local governments; (3) labor organizations with 15 or more members in industries affecting commerce; and (4) employment agencies." Henry H. Perritt, Jr.,
Employee Dismissal Law and Practice § 2.3, at 91 (3d ed. 1992) (citations omitted).
Under Title VII "[t]he class of potential plaintiffs is broader than that of employees in
the traditional sense." Id. (citing cases in which Title VII's protection extended to
nonemployees). Additionally, "[p]otential defendants include individual supervisors
as well as employers." Id
30. See 110 Cong. Rec. 2556 (1964) ("[T]he basic purpose of title VII is to prohibit
discrimination in employment on the basis of race or color.") (statement of Rep. Celler); 110 Cong. Rec. 2581 (1964) ("[L]et us not add any amendment that would place
in jeopardy in any way our primary objective of ending that discrimination that is
most serious, most urgent, most tragic, and most widespread against the Negroes of
our country.") (statement of Rep. Green); see also Nancy E. McGlen & Karen
O'Connor, Women's Rights: The Struggle for Equality in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries 175 (1983) (noting that the Civil Rights Act was "largely geared to
alleviating racial discrimination").
31. See Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 658 (D.D.C. 1976) (noting the "ample
evidence that Congress' intent was not to limit the scope and effect of Title VII, but
rather, to have it broadly construed"); see also Quick v. Donaldson Co., No. 95-3387,
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members of a given class, rather than only those who are traditionally
victims of discrimination. As with racial discrimination, this has been
construed to apply to any member of the protected class rather than
just those who are traditionally victims of discrimination, e.g., men as
well as women, and Catholics as well as Jews.32 Thus, the statute prohibits any employment practices motivated by the employee's or applicant's membership in a protected class, 33regardless of which race,
sex, religion, or national origin is involved.

This part discusses the political background of Title VII leading up
to the statute's enactment. In particular, this part traces the role of
the women's movement in the inclusion of "sex" in Title VII, and the
subsequent development of the provision into a powerful tool for women against sex discrimination in the workplace.
A. The PoliticalBackground of Title VII The Women's Movement
The political background of Title VII and the role of the women's
movement in the development of Title VII doctrine shaped and directed the protection afforded to victims of sexual harassment under
the statute. As noted above, however, some individuals fall outside of
Title VII's scope. Nevertheless, Title VII's development into a powerful tool against sex discrimination demonstrates the potential for a
statutory remedy to effectively address sexual harassment as a whole
in the workplace. At the same time, Title VII's history emphasizes the
need to fashion the federal legislation in such a way as not to lessen
Title VII's effectiveness in the realm of sex discrimination which encompasses many cases of sexual harassment.
With the civil rights movement in the African-American community
during the 1960s came a "renewed struggle" for women's equality' 4
Recognizing the pervasive discrimination against them, women campaigned for the presidency of John F. Kennedy, with the hope that he
1996 WL 420381, at *5 (8th Cir. July 29, 1996) (stating that "Congress intended to

define discrimination in the broadest possible terms"); 110 Cong. Rec. 6548 (1964)

("Title VII is designed to give Negroes and other minority members a fair chance to

earn a livelihood and contribute their talents to the building of a more prosperous

America.") (statement of Rep. Humphrey); 110 Cong. Rec. 2583 (1964) ("Let us recognize that there are many minorities in this country.... For their opportunity, we
seek to secure these rights under this bill ... .") (statement of Rep. Kelly).
32. E.g., Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 749 (4th Cir. 1996)

("While Congress' particular focus in amending Title VII to prohibit discrimination
on the basis of 'sex' was to ensure equal employment rights for women, the Supreme
Court has interpreted the Act's broad language to protect both men and women.").
33. Thus, the policy of Title VII, as stated in section 701(a), reads:

The Congress hereby declares that the opportunity for employment without
discrimination of the types described in sections 704 and 705 is a right of all
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States, and that it is the national policy to protect the right of the individual to be free from such
discrimination.
110 Cong. Rec. 6548 (1964).

34. Sara M. Evans, Born for Liberty: A History of Women in America 273 (1989).
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would work to further women's rights.35 After his election, President
Kennedy created the President's Commission on the Status of Women
("CSW") on December 14, 1961.36 The CSW's mandate "was to analyze and recommend changes to end the 'prejudices and outmoded
customs that act as a barrier to full realization of women's basic
rights. ' ' 37 The Commission was chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt and
led to the creation of state commissions as well, thus establishing a
communications network that fostered awareness both of women's
pervasive secondary status and the need to take ameliorative action.38
The first major legislative victory for women arising out of
this renewed feminist movement 39 was the Equal Pay Act of
35. See McGlen & O'Connor, supra note 30, at 169.
36. See id; Evans, supra note 34, at 274. Kennedy's establishment of the CSW was
partially an effort to appease women voters who felt that Kennedy failed to fulfill his
promise of promoting the equality of women. See McGlen & O'Connor, supra note
30, at 169 (asserting that Kennedy created the Commission on the Status of Women to
appease "outraged" female supporters when only two out of Kennedy's 240 appointees were women); Women's Rights in the United States: A Documentary History
279 (Winston E. Langley & Vivian C. Fox eds., 1994) [hereinafter Documentary History] (noting that the Commission on the Status of Women served other purposes,
such as "giving greater satisfaction to women, an important political constituency").
In addition, Kennedy was hoping possibly to quiet the struggle for the Equal Rights
Amendment. See Documentary History, supra,at 279 ("Equally important, the Kennedy administration hoped that the commission would help it deal tactfully with the
politically controversial issue of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution."); McGlen & O'Connor, supra note 30, at 169 (noting that some believed
that the Commission on the Status of Women was created partially in an effort "to get
the 'administration off the hook on the equal rights amendment question"' (quoting
Mary A. Baker et al., Women Today: A Multidisciplinary Approach to Women's
Studies 24 (1980)).
37. McGlen & O'Connor, supra note 30, at 169 (quoting Executive Order 10980
(Dec. 14, 1961)). Rather than advocating special protections for women, the CSW
believed that "equality of rights under the law for all persons, male or female [was] so
basic to democracy... that it must be reflected in the fundamental law of the land."
Evans, supra note 34, at 274 (quoting the CSW's report). Accordingly, the CSW, as
Kennedy had hoped, opposed the Equal Rights Amendment, instead asserting that
women already had protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution. Id
38. McGlen & O'Connor, supra note 30, at 28, 169. These commissions "laid the
groundwork for the future movement" in three ways:
(1) it brought together many knowledgeable, politically active women who
otherwise would not have worked together around matters of direct concern
to women; (2) the investigations unearthed ample evidence of women's unequal status, especially their legal and economic difficulties, in the process
convincing many previously uninterested women that something should be
done; (3) the reports created a climate of expectations that something would
be done.
Jo Freeman, The Politics of Women's Liberation: A Case Study of an Emerging Social Movement and Its Relation to the Policy Process 52 (1975); see also McGlen &
O'Connor, supra note 30, at 28 (recognizing that reports of federal and state commissions "documented, often for the first time, the extent of discrimination against
women").
39. The women's movement began in the 1800s with the campaign for suffrage,
protesting "discrimination that legally subordinated women to men and made a mock-
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196340 which was recommended by the CSW. 4 ' The women's movement was active in the passage of the Equal Pay Act, and provided
Congress with extensive information documenting the extent and
42 the
severity of discrimination against women in the United States.
B.

Passage of 77tde VII

The feminist movement's role in obtaining rights for women specifically under Title VII is unclear. Despite the active participation of
women's organizations in the enactment of the Equal Pay Act,4 3 as a
whole, feminist groups were noticeably absent from the proceedings
regarding Title VII.4 Although the severe unequal treatment of women was well known, there seemed to be less noticeable outward support specifically for the inclusion of "sex" in Title VII.45
ery of the nation's claim to be a community of equals." Jennifer K. Brown. The Nineteenth Amendment and Women's Equality, 102 Yale L.J. 2175,2175 (1993). Although
activity in the women's movement has occasionally surged on particular issues, e.g.,
suffrage, the Civil Rights Act, abortion, etc., the feminist movement has been a continuum that "took shape in the middle of the nineteenth century and continues as a
transformative force today." Id. at 2175. This continuous effort to achieve equality
eventually led to the inclusion of sex in Title VII, and a recognition of the extent of
women's subordination to men.
40. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1994). The Equal Pay Act makes it unlawful to pay
women less than men for equal work and reads, in pertinent part:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall
discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages
to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on
jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility,
and which are performed under similar working conditions.
Id. The Equal Pay Act was enforced by the Department of Labor ("DOL"), which
was empowered to bring suits to enforce the act. McGlen & O'Connor, supra note 30,
at 170. Because women could bring complaints anonymously, many complaints were
filed and then acted upon by the DOL. Id. As a result, the DOL collected over 100
million dollars in back pay awards in the first ten years of the act's existence, mostly
for female employees. Id. at 170-71.
41. See Documentary History, supra note 36, at 279; Evans, supra note 34, at 275.
42. See Caruthers G. Berger, Equal Pay, Equal Employment Opportunity and
Equal Enforcement of the Law for Women, 5 Val. U. L Rev. 326, 330 (1971).
43. See supra text accompanying note 42.
44. See McGlen & O'Connor, supra note 30, at 176 ("Unlike the large number of
women's groups that had testified in favor of the Equal Pay Act, that action was
missing [in support of Title VIII."). But see infra text accompanying notes 51-53
(presenting one commentator's view of the women's movement as the motivating factor for Congress's inclusion of sex within Title VII).
45. See McGlen & O'Connor, supra note 30, at 175 ("While Commission on the
Status of Women members recognized that employment discrimination was rampant,
no specific call was made by the commission for an antidiscrimination provision.").
But see Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The
Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 23 (1995) (noting that when
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was introduced without protection for women, "[t]he
National Women's Party and other supporters of the ERA began a campaign to have
sex included in the bill").
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In fact, the term "sex" was not added to the bill until the day before
its passage.46 Additionally, the motives of Representative Howard
Smith, a Southern congressman, in introducing the amendment have
been questioned. Judges and commentators have concluded that
Smith, "an ardent segregationist" 47 who opposed the Civil Rights Bill
as a whole, suggested the inclusion of "sex" within Title VII in order
to demonstrate the absurdity of the bill, divide supporters, and
thereby assure the bill's defeat.48 These commentators have insisted
that the amendment was proposed as a "joke,"4 9 and that the women's
movement had little to do with the passage of the provision. 50
Nonetheless, at least one commentator has argued that the extensive work of the women's organizations is the sole reason for the inclusion of sex in Title VII. 51 Caruthers Berger asserts that the
information revealed to Congress during the legislative hearings for
the Equal Pay Act "was influential in convincing Congress of the need
for the sex discrimination provision of Title VII." Thus, Berger dismisses the lack of legislative debate and history about the amendment
because the proceedings surrounding the Equal Pay Act revealed the
status of women and made the "exploitation of women in employment
...a

well known fact in American life."53

46. 110 Cong. Rec. 2577-84 (1964).
47. Evans, supra note 34, at 276.
48. Id.; Freeman, supra note 38, at 53; McGlen & O'Connor, supra note 30, at 175;
see infra note 49 and accompanying text.
49. Freeman, supra note 38, at 53; see Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp.
419, 428 n.36 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (stating that the amendment was intended as a
"joke"), aff'd, 805 F.2d 611 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Paul, supra note
19, at 339 n.24 and accompanying text; Michelle R. Peirce, Note, Sexual Harassment
and Title VII-A Better Solution, 30 B.C. L. Rev. 1071, 1076 & nn.39-43 (1989).
The record of the proceedings supports this view and undermines claims that Smith
was genuine in his proposal. When introducing the amendment, Smith read part of a
letter that he received from a woman in order "to illustrate that women have some
real grievances and some real rights to be protected." 110 Cong. Rec. 2577 (1964).
The letter noted an imbalance in the male and female population, and lamented that
this is a grave injustice to womankind and something the Congress and President Johnson should take immediate steps to correct ....Up until now,
instead of assisting these poor unfortunate females in obtaining their "right"
to happiness, the Government has on several occasions engaged in wars
which killed off a large number of eligible males, creating an "imbalance" in
our male and female population that was even worse than before.
Id. Although this may have been read in an attempt to highlight, in Smith's view, the
absurdity of the bill, it hardly reflects a deep commitment to women's equality.
50. Freeman, supra note 38, at 53 n.24 (noting that Representative Martha Griffiths "told [Freeman] in 1969 that the [National Women's Party] did not have a great
influence on congress [sic]"); McGlen & O'Connor, supra note 30, at 176 ("The enactment of [Title VII] is interesting because no organized women's group spoke in its
behalf, although Griffiths and other female representatives lined up solidly behind its
passage.").
51. Berger, supra note 42, at 330-38.
52. Id. at 330.
53. Id. at 330-31.
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More likely, it was a combination of these scenarios that inspired
the proposal and inclusion of sex within Title VII.1 To focus solely on
Smith's alternative motives for proposing the amendment ignores the
continuous struggle for women's equality beginning with the suffrage
movement, continuing with the Equal Rights Amendment movement,
and leading up to the Civil Rights Act.
Regardless of Smith's intentions in introducing the amendment, the
congresswomen avidly argued for its inclusion and the bill was passed
in its entirety.5 5 Even if women's organizations were not vocal with
respect to Title VII, these groups nonetheless enlightened Congress
about the discrimination of women and fully supported equal rights, in
some form, for women.5 6 Thus, despite the last minute inclusion of
sex within Title VII, the amendment reflects a long advocacy by feminist groups for the equal rights of women.'
C. Protectionfor Women Under Title VII: Another Struggle for the
Women's Movement
Despite the controversy over the inclusion of sex within Title VII,
the EEOC, the agency created to enforce Title VII, initially rendered
the provision virtually meaningless. Immediately after the passage of
the Act, the EEOC itself "still considered the inclusion of sex a bit of
a joke. ' 58 The EEOC was completely ineffective in its enforcement of
the act, and thus, despite the fight for women's equality, the inclusion
54. See Evans, supra note 34, at 276 (positing that "[a]s a long-time supporter of
the ERA [Smith] offered the amendment seriously, but as an ardent segregationist he
probably also hoped it would help to kill the bill"); Franke, supra note 45, at 23 ("For
Smith, it was a win/win strategy: either the sex amendment would defeat the Civil
Rights Act-a regulation of private business which he opposed-or it would amount
to the passage of the ERA-a measure that he had always supported.").
55. Franke, supra note 45, at 23-24. (noting that after Smith proposed the amendment, "all but one of the women members of the House spoke in favor of the amendment"); Freeman, supra note 38, at 54 (recognizing the "determined leadership of the
congresswomen" that led to the passage of the act, despite the disagreement over the
inclusion of sex).
56. See Evans, supra note 34, at 276 (noting that the feminist movement and recent victory of the Equal Pay Act "set the stage for debate on the 1964 Civil Rights
Act").
57. See Franke, supra note 45, at 15 (stating that the rights women possess under
the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII "reflect[ ] the results of a political and legal
compromise struck by leaders in the women's community and in Congress after years
of bitter debate about both what it means to be a woman and what it means to treat
women fairly").
58. Evans, supra note 34, at 276; see also Freeman, supra note 38, at 54 (quoting
the statement of the EEOC's first executive director that the provision was a " ' fluke'
that was 'conceived out of wedlock"'); McGlen & O'Connor, supra note 30, at 176
("From the beginning, EEOC officials refused to take the sex-discrimination provision seriously, noting its lack of legislative history and the mirth that it inspired when
it reached the floor."). Thus, Title VII differed significantly from the Equal Pay Act,
which the DOL enforced actively and successfully, and which gave real meaning to
the protection of women from discriminatory pay practices.
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of sex in Title VII was "aborted by the very agency set up to administer it."59 Alarmed by the failure of the EEOC to give effect to the
provisions of Title VII, women united and formed the National Organization for Women ("NOW") and took a more active and visible
role in the development of Title VII.6 ° NOW exerted extensive pressure on the EEOC to enforce Title VII and to hold hearings in order
to promulgate 6regulations
regarding discrimination based on sex
1
under Title VII.
The EEOC finally enacted such regulations in 1972.62 Since then,
the EEOC
has taken a more active role in the enforcement of Title
VII,63 rendering Title VII a more accessible and legitimate means of
protection for women.
II.

SEXUAL HARASSMENT AS SEX DISCRIMINATION

This part illustrates the effect of Title VII's complicated history on
the scope of protection from sexual harassment under the statute.
Specifically, this part discusses the courts' initial skepticism of women's rights, and the resulting narrow construction of "sex." In addition this part notes the development of the "but-for" requirement that
courts used to determine whether there was discrimination based on
sex. This part also discusses the culmination of the feminist movement's emphasis on the secondary status of women-Catharine
MacKinnon's expansive "inequality" approach to sexual harassment.
The acceptance of MacKinnon's categorization of sexual harassment
as a form of sex discrimination provided broader protection for victims of discrimination and more fully recognized women's unequal
status.
59. Freeman, supra note 38, at 54; see also McGlen & O'Connor, supra note 30, at
176 (noting the EEOC's "totally inadequate" enforcement of Title VII).
60. Evans, supra note 34, at 277-78; Freeman, supra note 38, at 55.
61. Evans, supra note 34, at 277-78 (listing among NOW's activities "continuous
pressure on the EEOC to enforce Title VII"); McGlen & O'Connor, supra note 30, at
176 (noting NOW's pressure on the EEOC throughout 1966 to hold hearings in order
to issue regulations). In May 1967, the EEOC held the hearings. McGlen &
O'Connor, supra note 30, at 176.
62. 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (1995).
63. See infra note 129 (outlining the EEOC's role in Title VII actions). In addition, Congress enacted the Equal Employment Opportunity Act in 1972, which enabled the EEOC to bring suits against discriminatory employers. Congress also passed
Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1972, which prohibited discrimination against women in educational programs receiving federal funds. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994). Together, these legislative victories give substance to women's rights. Title IX ensures
that women will be trained and qualified for jobs, which, under Title VII, more women will be able to pursue. Finally, under the Equal Pay Act, women can receive
equal compensation for these jobs. Most recently, Congress enacted the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, providing for compensatory and punitive damages in Title VII actions,
thereby demonstrating a full-fledged commitment to women's equality. Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
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A. The Definition of "Sex" Under Title VII
Integral to Title VII analysis is the definition of "sex." In the absence of legislative history regarding the provision, courts have de-

bated the meaning of "sex" ' and generally have construed the term
consistently with the plain meaning of the word.15 Therefore, courts
have held sex "to mean either 'man' or 'woman,"' thus "bar[ring]
workplace harassment against women because they are women and
against men because they are men."' Under this narrow definition,
sex "encompass[es] only gender rather than any characteristic relating
to sexuality or sexual behavior." 67 Thus, courts have focused on a
traditional notion of sex, rather than any broader conceptions involving sexual orientation or sexual affiliations.
In addition, courts have used the terms "sex" and "gender" interchangeably in Title VII analysis. 68 Although gender has been defined
to include cultural and societal classifications of masculine and feminine rather than just biological classifications of "man" and "woman,"
courts generally ignore this more69 expansive definition of gender, and
instead construe it to mean sex.

64. See Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F3d 745,749 (4th Cir. 1996) (en
banc) ("Since Title VII's enactment, the meaning of the term 'sex' as used in the Act
has become the subject of judicial and academic debate.").
65. See Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting
that "[ilt is a maxim of statutory construction that, unless otherwise defined, words
should be given their ordinary, common meaning"), cert denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985);
Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) (stating that in the
"absence of clear congressional intent," terms must be given their plain meaning);
Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977) (interpreting
"sex" in light of its plain meaning).
66. Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1377 (8th Cir. 1996); accord Ulane,742
F.2d at 1085 (finding that the plain meaning of "sex" proscribes discrimination
"against women because they are women and against men because they are men");
Doe v. United States Postal Serv., 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1867, 1868 (D.D.C.
1985) (concluding that there is no indication that "sex" includes "anything other than
the biological male or female sexes").
67. Charles R Calleros, The Meaning of "Sex". Homosexual and Bisexual Harassment Under Title VII, 20 Vt. L. Rev. 55, 58 (1995).
68. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252 (1989) (using "gender" to
determine that sex-stereotyping violates Title VII); Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l
Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 n.1 (N.D. Ind. 1995) ("'Sex' [under Title VII] means
gender, not behavior or affection"); Pritchett v. Sizeler Real Estate Management Co.,
Civ. A. No. 93-2351, 1995 WL 241855, at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 25, 1995) (using "gender"
and "gender discrimination" when discussing the viability of same-sex sexual harassment under Title VII).
69. See Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745,749 n.1 (4th Cir. 1996)
(stating that "courts, speaking in the context of Title VII, have used the term [sic]
'sex' and 'gender' interchangeably to refer simply to the fact that an employee is male
or female"). But see J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1436 n.1 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (distinguishing between "sex" and "gender" and noting that "'gender' has
acquired the new and useful connotation of cultural or attitudinal characteristics (as
opposed to physical characteristics) distinctive to the sexes"); Dobre v. National RtRt
Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284, 286 (E.D. Pa. 1993) ("The term 'sex'... is not
synonymous with 'gender."). In differentiating between the two terms, the Dobre
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The Supreme Court expanded this narrow definition of sex in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins' by determining that sex-stereotyping violated Title VII.71 In Price Waterhouse, the plaintiff was denied partnership, despite an impressive record, due to what certain partners
described as a "macho" attitude that "overcompensated for being a
woman."'72 In addition, the plaintiff was told that in order to increase
her chances for partnership, she should "walk more femininely, talk
more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair
styled, and wear jewelry."73 In determining that Price Waterhouse violated Title VII, the Supreme Court stated:
In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on
the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she
must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.
...

An employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but

whose positions require this trait places women in an intolerable
and impermissible catch 22: out of a job if they behave aggressively
and out of a job if they do not. Title VII lifts women out of this
bind.74
Thus, in Price Waterhouse, the Court extended Title VII's protection
against sex-based discrimination to include stereotypical notions of
behavioral characteristics associated with being a man or a woman.
The judiciary, however, has limited this holding to stereotypes that
relate to male or female characteristics, such as aggressiveness or passivity, that affect employment decisions, and have refused to consider
these stereotypes as they relate to sexual orientation. 75 Therefore,
courts interpret the Supreme Court's holding in Price Waterhouse as
prohibiting stereotypes that relate to an individual's sex, i.e., male or
female, but not an individual's sexuality. 76 Accordingly, courts have

rejected arguments asserting that Title VII prohibits discrimination on

court noted that "[t]he term 'sex' in Title VII refers to an individual's distinguishing
biological or anatomical characteristics, whereas the term 'gender' refers to an individual's sexual identity." Dobre, 850 F. Supp. at 286.
70. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
71. Id. at 250-52.
72. Id. at 235.
73. Id (quoting Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (D.D.C.

1985)).

74. Id at 250-51.

75. See Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 WL 5436, at *9-10 (6th Cir. Jan. 15,

1992).
76. See supra note 6 (defining sexuality as a combination of gender and sexual
behavior).
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the basis of sexual orientation or preference 7 because such discrimi-

nation is based on gender stereotypes.78
Courts have also emphasized that Congress intended to remedy the
inequality between men and women through the provision regarding
sex discrimination.7 9 Thus, in light of Congress's refusals to extend
the protection of Title VII beyond the narrow definition of sex,

courts have refused to make such an extension as

0

well.81

77. See, e.g., Marcosson, supra note 17, at 25 (arguing that harassment based on
sexual orientation violates Title VII because it is "based upon the ultimate stereotype
of proper sexual roles"); Sandra Levitsky, Note, Footnote 55: Closing the "Bisexual
Defense" Loophole in Title VII Sexual HarassmentCases, 80 Minn. L Rev. 1013, 1034,
1038-44 (1996) (advocating a dominance analysis that focuses on whether the harassment "perpetuated gender stereotypes" and stigmatized victims for "demonstrating
real or perceived characteristics of a subordinate sex"); Miranda Oshige, Note, What's
Sex Got to Do with It?, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 565, 567 (1995) (asserting that plaintiffs
should only have to demonstrate that they were subjected to disparate treatment that
was because of sex, and which perpetuated "invidious stereotypes about women");
Lisa Wehren, Note, Same-Gender Sexual Harassment Under Title VII: Garcia v. Elf
Atochem Marks a Step in the Wrong Direction, 32 Cal. W. L Rev. 87, 124 (1995)
(asserting that courts utilizing the "but-for" requirement "should take into consideration other aspects of gender, such as gender stereotypes, especially those concerning
appropriate sexual conduct").
78. See, e.g., Dillon, 1992 WL 5436, at *10 (noting that the plaintiff was not placed
in the "intolerable and impermissible Catch-22" requiring him to display certain traits
to keep his job, while at the same time losing his job for displaying those traits (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989)).
79. See Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 749 (4th Cir. 1996)
(stating that Congress's "particular focus in amending Title VII to prohibit discrimination on the basis of 'sex' was to ensure equal employment rights for women"); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) (noting that the "major
thrust of the 'sex' amendment was towards providing equal opportunities for women"); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977) ("[T]he
clear intent of the 1972 legislation was to remedy the economic deprivation of women
as a class.").
80. All legislative attempts to broaden the scope of Title VII have failed. See H.R.
709, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 1454, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. 2074,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H.R. 8269, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 5239, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 4794, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 2998, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 451, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.RI 5452, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975); H.R. 2667, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 166, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975). In addition, the Employment Non-Discrimination Acts of 1994, see 140 Cong.
Rec. E1311 (daily ed. June 23, 1994), and 1995, see 141 Cong. Rec. S8502 (daily ed.
June 15, 1995), both of which prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation,
failed. Most recently, the Senate, in a 50 to 49 vote, defeated an anti-discrimination
measure which would have banned discrimination based on sexual orientation in the
workplace. See Eric Schmitt, Senators Reject Gay Marriage Bill and Job Bias Ban,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1996, at Al. Even if the measure had passed, the bill "faced stiff
opposition in the House [of Representatives]." Id.
81. See, eg., Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984)
(citing Congress's rejection of an extension of Title VII to include protection for sexual orientation as a reason for giving "sex" a traditional, narrow meaning), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662
(9th Cir. 1977) (same); Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Medical Ctr., 403 F. Supp. 456,457
(N.D. Cal. 1975), affd, 570 F.2d 354 (1978) (same). Accordingly, courts have found
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The "But-For" Requirement Under Title VII

In addition to construing "sex" narrowly, courts have found that in
order to state a claim, a victim must show that he or she was discriminated against because of his or her sex. This requirement has been
termed the "but-for" requirement-the victim's sex must be a "butfor" cause of the discrimination in order to state a claim under Title
VIIY2 When read in conjunction with courts' interpretation of sex,
plaintiffs must show that they were harassed because they are men or

women.
Consistent with this strict "but-for" approach, courts initially were
skeptical of sexual harassment claims.83 In Come v. Bausch & Lomb,
Inc.,S4 the court stated that "there is nothing in [Title VII] which could
reasonably be construed to have it apply to 'verbal and physical sexual
advances' by another employee, even though he be in a supervisory
capacity where such complained of acts or conduct had no relationship to the nature of the employment."85 Because sexual harassment
was aimed at an individual rather than a group, and dealt with "personal urge[s]" and "proclivites], '86 sex was considered to be merely
incidental to the harassment.Y Consequently, the victim was deemed
not to have been harassed because of her sex, and she could not state
a claim under Title VII.8 Instead, courts limited Title VII sex discrimination claims to cases involving disparate treatment8 9 and dispathat Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation, transsexualism, or sexual affiliations. See infra part III.D.
82. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982) (noting that a
plaintiff must show that but for her sex, she would not have been harassed in order to
state a claim of hostile work environment sexual harassment); Kristi J. Johnson, Comment, Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corporation: What Does It Mean to Be Harassed
"Because Of" Your Sex?: Sexual Stereotyping and the "Bisexual" HarasserRevisited,
79 Iowa L. Rev. 731, 737-38 (1994) (noting that gender must be a "but-for" cause of
the victim's harassment to be actionable under Title VII).
83. Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd,
568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal.
1976), rev'd, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp.
161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977); Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123 (D.D.C. 1974); see also Paul, supra note 19, at 338 (noting that the "early cases almost unanimously said that sexual harassment fell outside
practices proscribed by the Civil Rights Act"); Peirce, supra note 49, at 1080 & n.72
(stating that courts' unwillingness to allow claims of sexual harassment under Title
VII "stemmed from a view that sexual harassment is a personal attack, not a gender
issue").
84. 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
85. 390 F. Supp. at 163.
86. Id.
87. Id.; see also Peirce, supra note 49, at 1073 (discussing the courts' refusal to
extend Title VII's protection to sexual harassment because "gender was incidental to
the sexual advance or attack").
88. 390 F. Supp. at 163.
89. Disparate treatment requires proof of intentional discrimination and is the basis for quid pro quo and hostile work environment sexual harassment claims. See Paul,
supra note 19, at 337. Disparate treatment could include, for example, a policy or
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509

rate impact.9 0 Under both of these theories, the "but-for"
requirement works to establish discrimination against a protected
class such as women.
C. The "Inequality"Approach to Sexual Harassment
In 1979, Catharine MacKinnon published her well-known book,
Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination.91 MacKinnon begins her book with the following statement:
Intimate violation of women by men is sufficiently pervasive in
American society as to be nearly invisible. Contained by internalized and structural forms of power, it has been nearly inaudible.
Conjoined with men's control over women's material survival, as in
practice of excluding women, regardless of their qualifications, from certain jobs
where sex is not a bona fide occupational qualification. See Calleros, supra note 67, at

58-59; see also, eg., Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1223-24 (9th Cir.
1971) (finding that an employment practice that excluded women because they were
not considered "physically or biologically suited for such work" distinguished between employees on the basis of sex when sex was not a bona fide occupational qualification); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235-36 (5th Cir. 1969)
(holding that sex was not a bona fide occupational qualification for a job simply because the job required heavy lifting, and therefore, the employer violated Title VII by
refusing to give the job to a female employee).
Under a disparate treatment theory, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). If the
plaintiff meets this standard, the burden then shifts to the employer "to articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." Id. Finally,
even if the employer articulates a nondiscriminatory reason for the decision, the
plaintiff may establish that the reason proffered is a pretext for discrimination. Id. at
804-05. The exact proof required under this framework varies on a case-by-case basis.
Id. at 802 n.13.
90. Disparate impact cases involve employer practices or regulations which appear
facially neutral, but in fact disproportionately disadvantage protected groups. See Calleros, supra note 67, at 58-59. For example, an employer might require a minimum
height or weight requirement for a job which is set at such a level that it excludes only
a small percentage of males, but a large percentage of females. Unless there is a
legitimate job-related necessity for the requirement, it violates Title Vfl. See id. at 59
nn.20-24 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,
329-31 (1977) (finding that a height and weight requirement for correctional counselors that resulted in an exclusion of 3329% of women and only 1.28% of men on the
basis of height, and 22.29% of women and 2.35% of men on the basis of weight, had a
discriminatory impact on women); Blake v. Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1376 (9th Cir.
1979) (holding that a policy "maintain[ing] sex-segregated job classifications that
barred all women from police patrol work and prohibited women from being promoted above the level of sergeant," violated Title VII because there was no evidence
that such a policy "was necessary to the safe and efficient operation" of the police
department), cert denied, 446 U.S. 928 (1980).
Disparate impact analysis involves a three-part inquiry. Dorhard,433 U.S. at 329.
First, a plaintiff must show that "facially neutral standards" used for the selection of
applicants result in a discriminatory hiring pattern. Id. Once established, the employer may demonstrate that the standards used have "a manifest relationship to the
employment in question." Id-(quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 411 U.S. 424, 432
(1971)). Even if the requirement is job related, the plaintiff may still show that other,
nondiscriminatory hiring devices could be employed. i
91. MacKinnon, supra note 6.
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the home or on the job, or over women's learning and educational
advancement in school, it has become institutionalized. Women
employed in the paid labor force, typically hired "as women," dependent upon their income and lacking job alternatives, are particularly vulnerable to intimate violation in the form of sexual abuse at
work.92
MacKinnon defines sexual harassment as "the unwanted imposition of
sexual requirements in the context of a relationship of unequal power.
Central to the concept is the use of power derived from one
social
sphere to lever benefits or impose deprivations in another. '93
MacKinnon's theory highlights the distinction between the "differences" approach and the "inequality" approach.94 The differences approach that courts utilize in discrimination cases rests on the premise
that similarly situated individuals should be treated equally. 5 Thus,
the differences approach does not prohibit all distinctions between the
sexes, but instead, only prohibits distinctions that are "inaccurate or
overgeneralized,"96 and focuses only on those distinctions that are "irrationally grounded upon a sex difference." 97
In contrast, the inequality approach recognizes that "sex discrimination is a system that defines women as inferior from men, that cumulatively disadvantages women for their differences from men, as well as
ignores their similarities."98 Because women have been subordinated
to men socially and defined as women by their sexuality, they are in
fact discriminated against because of sex when they are sexually
harassed. 99 The inequality approach centers on the second class status
of women as a group, and the powerful hierarchy in the workplace
that keeps women subordinate to men."° Thus, MacKinnon argues
that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination: "Women are
sexually harassed because they are women, in the full social meaning
of the term. Sexual harassment is a clear social manifestation of male
privilege incarnated in the male sex role that supports coercive sexuality reinforced by male power over the job."''
MacKinnon's theory of sexual harassment as sex discrimination was
revolutionary and it radically altered the case law regarding sexual
harassment.10 2 MacKinnon is credited with creating the distinction
92. Id.at 1 (footnotes omitted).
93. Id
94. Id.at 4.
95. Id. at 107.
96. Id. at 101.
97. Id.at 101-02.
98. Id.at 116.
99. See id. at 182 ("Sexual harassment is discrimination 'based on sex' in the inequality approach because women are socially defined largely in sexual terms.").
100. Id.at 102.
101. Id.at 191-92.
102. See Jeffrey Minson, Questions of Conduct: Sexual Harassment, Citizenship,
Government 70 (1993) (noting that MacKinnon's role in the development of sexual
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between quid pro quo10 3 and hostile work environment 1" sexual harassment that was later adopted by the Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson °5 and added a tremendous amount of
protection for women under Title VII.
Courts have accepted MacKinnon's paradigm of sexual harassment
as sex discrimination' 0 6 and have recognized the pervasive subordination of women in the workplace.' 0 ' The "but-for" requirement is met
harassment is "exemplary" and that her theories have "helped to shape legal judgements [sic] both in the US and abroad"); Holly B. Fechner, Toward an Expanded
Conception of Law Refori. Sexual HarassmentLaw and the Reconstruction of Facts,
23 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 475, 481 (1990) (describing Sexual Harassment of Working Women as a "major conceptual breakthrough in feminist theory"). Even though MacKinnon's book was not published until 1979, drafts of the book were circulated as early
as 1975, a "critical year" for sexual harassment case law. Minson, supra, at 70.
103. Quid pro quo harassment involves the conditioning of job benefits on the submission to sexual advances. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 989-90 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 657 (D.D.C. 1976) (finding that a supervisor's
retaliation for an employee's rejection of his sexual advances constituted sex discrimination and that such conduct creates "an artificial barrier to employment which was
placed before one gender and not the other"); see Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., 957 F.2d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1992). A quid pro quo claim requires the denial of
an economic benefit either because of sex or because the plaintiff rejected a supervisor's sexual advance. Id In the case of quid pro quo harassment, the -but-for" requirement conveniently is considered fulfilled because courts assume that a male
solicits sexual favors from the victim because she is a woman and would not similarly
solicit men. Barnes,561 F.2d at 990; see also Samuel A. Marcosson, Harassmenton the
Basis of Sexual Orientation: A Claim of Sex DiscriminationUnder 7ttle VII, 81 Geo.
L.i. 1, 34 & n.129 (1992) (noting that "in order to maximize his chances of 'success,'"
a harasser will target someone of the opposite sex; thus, a heterosexual male will
target females, while a homosexual male will target men).
104. See Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (holding that "a
plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on
sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment"); Henson v. City of Dundee,
682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982) ("Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or
offensive environment for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to
sexual equality at the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality.").
Hostile work environments were first recognized as a form of discrimination in the
context of racial harassment in Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)
("[E]mployment discrimination... [is] no longer confined to bread and butter issues.... One can readily envision working environments so heavily polluted with
discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability of
minority group workers, and... Title VII was aimed at the eradication of such noxious practices."), cert denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972). Essentially, a plaintiff must establish five elements to maintain a claim of hostile work environment sexual harassment:
(1) membership in a protected class, (2) unwelcome sexual conduct, (3) the harassment would not have occurred but for his or her sex, (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to affect "term, condition, or privilege" of employment, (5)
respondeat superior. Henson, 682 F.2d at 903-05.
105. 477 U.S. 57 (1986); see Fechner, supra note 102, at 483 (noting that MacKinnon developed the two distinct theories of sexual harassment).
106. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 681 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson, 682
F.2d at 908 n.18; Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 945-46 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
107. Numerous commentators and studies have noted the widespread discrimination and harassment of women in the workplace. See Paul, supra note 19, at 333 ("In
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in these cases, because, as MacKinnon emphasized, women were defined in sexual terms; 10 8 therefore, when women were sexually
harassed, they unquestionably were harassed because of sex.
Since the acceptance of sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination, courts have recognized that Title VII also includes claims of
"reverse harassment" where a female harasses a male, 10 9 and cases of
sexual favoritism where the work environment generally requires
"submission to sexual demands on the part of women [as] a condition
to tangible employment benefits."" 0 In each of these cases, members
of one sex are treated differently than members of the other sex and
thus are discriminated against because of their sex.

the 1970s and 80s, women entered the workplace in ever increasing numbers, and the
women's movement raised the issue of women's putative subjection to men with ever
greater vehemence."); see also Center for Women Policy Studies, Harassment and
Discrimination of Women in Employment 1 (1981) ("All women who work must do
so with the expectation that they are likely to experience harassment at some time in
their working lives. Many women experience it on a daily basis as part of the standard work environment."); Kerry Segrave, The Sexual Harassment of Women in the
Workplace, 1600 to 1993, at 200-03 (1994) (citing two studies of sexual harassment in
the federal government workplace conducted by the Merit Systems Protection Board,
each of which showed that 42% of the female respondents experienced some form of
sexual harassment); B. Glenn George, The Back Door: Legitimizing Sexual Harassment Claims, 73 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 2 n.3 (1993) (providing statistics indicating the pervasive sexual harassment of women in the workplace).
108. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
109. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (noting that
female-male harassment presents the same "legal problem" as male-female
harassment).
110. Dirksen v. City of Springfield, 842 F. Supp. 1117, 1122 (C.D. Ill. 1994) (finding
"'gender' based discrimination" where employees were required to grant sexual favors for professional advancement); see King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 882 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (finding that an employee who was passed over for a promotion due to a fellow
employee's sexual relationship with the supervisor established a claim of discrimination); Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269, 1277 (D.D.C. 1988) ("Title VII is ...
violated when an employer affords preferential treatment to female employees who
submit to sexual advances or other conduct of a sexual nature and such conduct is a
matter of common knowledge."); Priest v. Rotary, 634 F. Supp. 571, 581 (N.D. Cal.
1986) (defining sexual favoritism as "preferential treatment to female employees who
submit to [an employer's] sexual advances or other conduct of a sexual nature, or
when [an employer's] conduct or statements, impl[y] that job benefits will be conditioned on an employee's good natured endurance of his sexually-charged conduct or
sexual advances" (citing Toscano v. Nimmo, 570 F. Supp. 1197 (D. Del. 1983)). These
cases are limited, however, to those in which tolerance of sexual behavior in exchange
for job benefits is a generally known condition in the workplace. Title VII does not
encompass cases involving a single instance of favoritism where a supervisor prefers
his paramour over other employees. DeCintio v. Westchester County Medical Ctr.,
807 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1986). In DeCintio, a supervisor created a position with
special requirements that only his paramour could fill, to the exclusion of several male
employees. I The court determined that the passed-over employees were not discriminated against based on sex because a female employee would have been in the
same position-the supervisor would consider no one for the position other than his
paramour. Id.

19961

BEYOND SEX DISCRIMINATION
i.

ADDITIONAL FORMS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT

The judiciary's definition of sex and its "but-for" analysis determine
whether Title VII affords protection for other forms of sexual harassment. This part outlines the effect of the "but-for" requirement in the
emerging area of same-sex sexual harassment and the resulting split
among the courts in their treatment of same-sex sexual harassment
cases. Furthermore, this part discusses forms of harassment that,
although abusive, fall outside of Title Vil's proscription on sex discrimination due to the "but-for" requirement and/or a narrow construction of "sex."
A.

Same-Sex Sexual Harassment

Since the early 1980s, there has been a stream of cases alleging
same-sex sexual harassment."' Courts are divided as to whether har-

assment by a member of the same sex is discrimination based on sex
within the meaning of Title VII." 2 Oddly, courts on both sides of the
issue have 13
relied, at least in part, on the "but-for" requirement in their
decisions."

1. Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Violates Title VII as
Discrimination Based on Sex
Many courts have recognized a cause of action for victims of samesex sexual harassment, 1 4 utilizing a "but-for" analysis of the claims to
111. See Megan P. Norris & Mark A. Randon, Sexual Orientation and the Workplace: Recent Developments in Discrimination and Harassment Law, 19 Employee
Rel. LJ.233, 234 (1993) ("[T]he number of workplace lawsuits involving sexual orientation has increased significantly in recent years."). Norris and Randon note that generally two types of cases arise--either same-sex sexual harassment by a homosexual
harasser, or harassment of a homosexual or bisexual because of sexual orientation. Id.
112. See infra notes 114, 137.
113. See infra notes 115-16, 151-60 and accompanying text.
114. See, eg., Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, Inc., 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
705, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (recognizing same-sex discrimination as actionable under
Title VII); Ecklund v. Fuisz Technology, Ltd., 905 F. Supp. 335, 337 (E.D. Va. 1995)
(same); Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1368, 1380 (C.D. Cal. 1995)
(holding that quid pro quo same-sex sexual harassment claims are not precluded as a
matter of law under Title VII); EEOC v. Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1100
(M.D. Tenn. 1995) (same); Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537, 541
(M.D. Ala. 1983) ("[U]nwelcomed homosexual harassment... states a violation of
Title VII."), affd, 749 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1984); Wright v. Methodist Youth Servs.,
511 F. Supp. 307, 310 (N.D. IlM. 1981) (allowing a claim of same-sex sexual harassment). But see McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195
(4th Cir. 1996) ("[A] claim does not lie where both the alleged harassers and the
victim are heterosexuals of the same sex."); Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d
446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding that harassment of a male by another male does
not constitute gender discrimination) (relying on Giddens v. Shell Oil Co., No. 928533 (5th Cir. Dec. 6, 1993) ("Harassment by a male supervisor against a male
subordinate does not state a claim under Title VII even though the harassment has
sexual overtones.")); Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l Corp., 867 F. Supp. 790, 793 (N.D.
Ind. 1994) ("[S]ame-sex sexual harassment is not actionable under Title VII.").
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determine that there was discrimination based on sex. 115 If the victim
can show that the harasser did not treat members of the opposite sex
the same way, then the victim was harassed because of his or her sex
and has a cause of action under Title VII. As a result of this approach,
same-sex sexual harassment cases often turn on the sexual orientation
of the harasser. 1 6 If the harasser is homosexual, the plaintiff can fulfill the "but-for" requirement and state a claim under Title VII because a homosexual male presumably would not direct sexual
advances at a woman.
In Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc.,117 however, the court re-

jected the view that the harasser must be homosexual in order to state
a same-sex sexual harassment claim. 118 Instead, the court held that
115. See Williams v. District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1996) ("[T]he
determinative question is... whether the sexual harassment would have occurred but
for the gender of victim."); Walden Book, 885 F. Supp. at 1102-03 ("[I]t is obvious that
sexual harassment by a homosexual supervisor of the same sex is exaction of a condition of employment which, but for his or her sex, an employee would not have
faced."); McCoy v. Johnson Controls World Servs., 878 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D. Ga.
1995) (holding that the plaintiff could meet the "based upon sex" requirement by
proving that her female harasser did not treat males in the same manner (quoting
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982))); Prescott v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1545, 1550-51 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (stating
that "[w]hen a homosexual man propositions or harasses a male subordinate, but does
not similarly proposition or harass female workers, the male employee has been singled out because of his gender"); Pritchett v. Sizeler Real Estate Management Co., 67
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1377, 1379 (E.D. La. 1995) ("Same gender harassment is
clearly a form of gender discrimination because 'but for' the gender of the
subordinate, she would not have been subjected to the harassment.").
116. See McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1195 n.4 (holding that, although a hostile environment sexual harassment claim fails when both the harasser and the victim are heterosexuals of the same-sex, the homosexuality of either might "make the claim
nevertheless cognizable as one of 'discrimination because of [the victim's] sex"' (alteration in original)); Tietgen v. Brown's Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1495,
1502 (E.D. Va. 1996) (holding that if the plaintiff can show by a preponderance of the
evidence that the harasser solicited sexual acts from the victim, the jury may infer that
the harassment was because of sex); Joyner, 597 F. Supp. at 541 (referring to same-sex
sexual harassment as "homosexual harassment"); Wehren, supra note 77, at 99 (noting that "when courts applied the 'but-for' test in the context of same-gender sexual
harassment, the actual or perceived sexual orientation of the harasser... dictated the
result"). But see infra notes 117-22 and accompanying text (discussing cases that recognize same-sex sexual harassment regardless of the sexual orientation of the
harasser).
117. 919 F. Supp. 351 (D. Nev. 1996).
118. lId at 356; see also Marciano v. Kash n' Karry Foodstores, Inc., No. 941657CIV-T-17A, 1996 WL 420879, at *3 (M.D. Fla. July 1, 1996) (describing sexual
preference and sexual orientation as "incidental occurrences" to a hostile work environment determination); Johnson v. Community Nursing Servs., No. Civ.
95CV1116G, 1996 WL 376875, at *3 (D. Utah May 28, 1996) (noting that the sexual
orientation of the harasser is irrelevant under Title VII); Williams, 916 F. Supp. at 7
(stating that because "Title VII makes no distinction based upon sexual orientation,"
the harasser's sexual orientation is not determinative); Blozis v. Mike Raisor Ford,
Inc., 896 F. Supp. 805, 806-07 (N.D. Ind. 1995) ("[A] man can state a claim under Title
VII for sexual harassment by another man only if he is being harassed because he is a
man. There may or may not be homosexual aspects to such harassment. There may
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"[a]s long as a plaintiff can prove he or she was harassed because of
his or her sex, the sexual preference of the parties is irrelevant to
whether a claim is stated." 119 Similarly, in Waag v. Thomas Pontiac,
Buick, GMC, Inc., 2 ' the court found no reason to "distinguish 'unwelcome' heterosexual advances from 'unwelcome' homosexual advances."'' In each case, the harassment would not have occurred but
for the victim's gender. 22
In addition to the "but-for" analysis, courts also rely on several

other theories in recognizing claims of same-sex sexual harassment.
Based on the non-exclusive language of Title VII, courts have held
that the text of the statute does not support the exclusion of same-sex
sexual harassment claims; had Congress intended to exclude samegender sexual harassment from the protection of the statute, they eas-

or may not be hatred of one's own gender involved." (footnote omitted)); Sardinia,69
Fair Empl.Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 710 (adopting the reasoning of Blozis). In Sardinia,a
male supervisor grabbed the plaintiff's genitals and buttocks and referred to him as
"babe" and "faggot." Id. at 706. Because the plaintiff alleged that the supervisor only
harassed males, id., the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, thereby "implicitly endors[ing] the proposition that, under Title VII, an individual can target a
member of his or her own gender for harassment and discrimination without being
sexually attracted to the victim." Jay W. Waks & SaraJane Steinberg, Courts Now
Find Same-Sex Harassment to Be Actionabl, But They Vary on the Relevance of a
Defendant's Sexual Orientation, Nat'l LJ., Jan. 8, 1996, at B4, B6.
119. Tanner, 919 F. Supp. at 356.
120. 930 F. Supp. 393 (D. Minn. 1996).
121. It at 401.
122. Id Courts rejecting the requirement that the harasser must be homosexual for
same-sex sexual harassment to be actionable reach the correct result in that they
avoid the anomalous result of some victims of same-sex harassment receiving protection while others do not. As a practical matter, though, it may be difficult to show
that a heterosexual harasser is harassing a member of the same sex because of his or
her sex. Therefore, it is likely that a victim of same-sex sexual harassment would
attempt to show that his or her harasser is a homosexual in order to clearly establish
harassment based on sex. Thus, despite these courts' more liberal approach, it may
have little effect in the end because, out of necessity, sexual orientation may still play
a large role in sexual harassment cases.
This point illustrates the difficulty of separating sexuality from claims of sexual harassment. Classic cases of male-female harassment are premised on, among other
things, the fact that men would not direct the offensive conduct at members of the
same sex because they are attracted to women. Sexuality and sexual orientation form
the basis of the rationale. Thus, the courts' summary conclusion that same-sex sexual
harassment can exist regardless of the sexual orientation of the harasser tends to refute an underlying premise of sexual harassment, and offers little guidance as to how a
plaintiff can fulfill the "but-for" requirement without referring to the sexual orientation of his or her harasser. Sexuality, and thus, sexual orientation, are integral factors
in sexual harassment analysis. As a result, Title VII should include protection from
discrimination based on sexual orientation. In the absence of an amendment, however, sexual harassment legislation would be the ideal mechanism for protecting those
victims who fall outside of Title VII's protective ambit. See infra part IV (proposing
sexual harassment legislation that prohibits sexual harassment regardless of the sexes
or sexual orientations of the parties).
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ily could have done so in the language of the statute. 2 3 Rather than
prohibiting discrimination by a "member of the opposite sex," however, Congress chose simply to use "the unmodified
word 'sex' when
1 24
referring to the discrimination that is forbidden.'
Furthermore, courts have pointed to the Supreme Court's use of
gender-neutral language when deciding sexual harassment cases.' 2 5 In
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,2 6 the Court used the genderneutral terms "supervisor" and "subordinate" rather than sex-specific
terms in deciding a case of male-female sexual harassment. 2 7 Thus,
lower courts have noted that the Supreme Court's use of gender-neutral terms in Meritor reflects Title VII's protection of all persons, regardless
of sex or sexual preference, from discrimination based on
8

sex.'1

123. See Ecklund v. Fuisz Technology, Ltd., 905 F. Supp. 335, 337 (E.D. Va. 1995)
(stating that the "literal language" of Title VII supports the view that same-sex sexual
harassment is cognizable); Prescott v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 878 F.
Supp. 1545, 1550 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (allowing a claim of same-sex sexual harassment
because, among other things, Congress did not indicate through the language of the
statute that same-sex harassment was excluded); see also Trish K. Murphy, Comment,
Without Distinction: Recognizing Coverage of Same-Gender Sexual Harassment
Under Title VII, 70 Wash. L. Rev. 1125, 1137 (1995) (arguing that because "Title VII
lacks gender-based limitations," the focus of sexual harassment analysis should be on
the discriminatory and unwelcome nature of the conduct rather than on the harasser's
sexual orientation).
124. Prescott, 878 F. Supp. at 1550.
125. See Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 351, 355-56 (D. Nev.
1996); Ecklund, 905 F. Supp. at 338; Sardinia v. Deliwood Foods, Inc., 69 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 705, 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F.
Supp. 283, 287 (D.D.C. 1995); McCoy v. Johnson Controls World Servs., 878 F. Supp.
229, 232 (S.D. Ga. 1995).
126. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
127. Id at 70.
128. Tanner, 919 F. Supp. at 355-56; Ecklund, 905 F. Supp. at 338; Sardinia, 69 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 709.
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Courts have further relied on the EEOC 2 9 Compliance Manual 130
to support the view that same-sex sexual harassment is included in
Title VII. 13 1 The Compliance Manual states:
The victim does not have to be of the opposite sex from the harasser. Since sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination, the
crucial inquiry is whether the harasser treats a member or members
of one sex differently from members of the other sex. The victim
and the harasser may be of the same sex where, for instance, the
sexual harassment is based on the victim's sex ... and the harasser

132
does not treat employees of the opposite sex the same way.
According to the Guidelines, as long as the harassment is based on
sex, the same sex of the parties does not render Title VII inapplicable.
Furthermore, these courts have rejected the view that Title VII exists solely for the protection of members of discrete and vulnerable

129. The EEOC is the administrative agency that enforces Title VII. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-4 to -12 (1994) (establishing the EEOC and enumerating the Commission's
various powers and duties). In addition to promulgating guidelines which aid in the
interpretation of the statute, the EEOC plays an integral role in the procedural aspects of bringing a Title VII claim. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, an individual
must file a charge regarding an alleged unlawful employment practice wvith the
EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). The Commission then must serve a written notice
of charge on the employer and conduct an investigation. Id. § 2000e-5(b). After such
an investigation, if the EEOC determines there is reasonable cause for the charge, the
Commission must attempt to resolve the unlawful employment practice through conferences with the employer. Id If the Commission cannot obtain an acceptable conciliation agreement from the respondent, the EEOC may bring a civil action against
any respondent that is not a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision. Id at § 2000e-5(f)(1). If, however, the EEOC dismisses a charge, or fails either
to procure a conciliation agreement or to file a civil action, the Commission shall
notify the aggrieved individual. Id Thereafter, the individual, or any other person
aggrieved by the alleged employment practice, may receive a right to sue letter from
the EEOC and pursue a civil action against the employer. Id.
Despite the EEOC's extensive role in Title VII actions, the EEOC Guidelines are
not binding on the courts. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65
(1986) (noting that the Guidelines are not "controlling upon the courts" (citing General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976))). The Guidelines, however, are
viewed as persuasive authority, and accordingly are given considerable weight. Id.
("[The Guidelines] do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance." (citing General Elec.,
429 U.S. at 141-42)); see also Ecklund, 905 F. Supp. at 338 (noting that "[s]everal
district courts throughout the country have found the EEOC's interpretation of Title
VII to be persuasive").
130. The EEOC issues the Compliance Manual (the "Manual") as a "reference
source for use by the [Equal Opportunity Specialists] and attorneys to familiarize
themselves with the positions that the Commission and the courts have taken on various issues arising under [inter alia] Title VII." EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 601.1.
The Manual provides information regarding EEOC investigations and procedure, and
discusses issues with respect to Commission Decision Precedent. See id. §§ 602-605.
The Manual also addresses policy issues with which investigators may have to grapple
and provides guidance regarding the investigation of those issues. See id. 88 604-605.
131. See Ecklund, 905 F. Supp. at 337-38; Sardinia,1995 WL 640502, at *6; Raney v.
District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 287 (D.D.C. 1995).
132. EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 615.2(b)(3).
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groups from discrimination by those in dominant and more powerful
groups.133 In arriving at such a conclusion, courts have compared sexual harassment to racial harassment and concluded that "[i]t would be
untenable to allow reverse discrimination cases but not same-sex sexual harassment cases to proceed under Title VII.' 1 In addition, the
requirement of an "anti-male" or "anti-female" environment is not an
element of Title VII jurisprudence. 3 5 Therefore, plaintiffs in Title VII
sexual harassment cases need not be members of the minority group
and be harassed by a member of the dominant group in the workplace. 136 Instead, they simply need to show that they were harassed
because of their sex.
2.

Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Does Not Constitute
Discrimination Based on Sex Under Title VII

Despite various courts' inclusion of same-sex sexual harassment
under Title VII, several courts have held that Title VII simply does
not protect against same-sex sexual harassment. 1 37 Primarily, these
courts reasoned that the environment must be a discriminatory onean anti-male or anti-female environment-in order for there to be
protection under Title VII. 13 8 Therefore, a male in a male-dominated
133. See Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 351, 354 (D. Nev. 1996)
(noting that "Title VII creates an individual claim which is ripe before the work environment has been poisoned for all workers of one sex or the other," and therefore
rejecting a requirement that the plaintiff prove an anti-male environment); Prescott v.
Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1545, 1550 (M.D. Ala. 1995)
(rejecting the argument that a male in a male-dominated workplace cannot state a
claim of sexual harassment because such an environment cannot be discriminatory).
But see Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l Corp., 867 F. Supp. 790, 796 (N.D. Ind. 1994)
("Title VII is aimed at a gender-biased atmosphere; an atmosphere of oppression by a
'dominant' gender."); Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Ill. 1988) ("In
fact, [the plaintiff] may have been harassed 'because' he is a male, but that harassment
was not of a kind which created an anti-male environment in the workplace.").
134. EEOC v. Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1103 (M.D. Tenn. 1995); see
Sardinia,1995 WL 640502, at *5-6 (noting the anomaly of allowing a claim of reverse
racial harassment, but barring a claim of same-sex harassment); Easton v. Crossland
Mortgage Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1368, 1379 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (same); Prescott, 878 F.
Supp. at 1550 (indicating that the requirement of an anti-male environment is "not
the current state of anti-discrimination jurisprudence" because a similar argument
could be made in cases where a white plaintiff sues for reverse discrimination under
Title VII) (citing McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279 (1976)
("Title VII ...proscribe[s] racial discrimination... against whites on the same terms
as racial discrimination against nonwhites ...
135. See Sardinia, 1995 WL 640502, at *4-5.
136. See, e.g., id. (stating that a requirement of an imbalance and abuse of power is
contradictory to the Supreme Court's holding in Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57 (1986)).
137. See Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446,451-52 (5th Cir. 1994); Martin
v. Norfolk S. Ry., 926 F. Supp. 1044, 1050 (N.D. Ala. 1996); Myers v. City of El Paso,
874 F. Supp. 1546, 1548 (W.D. Tex. 1995); Vandeventer, 867 F. Supp. at 796; Polly v.
Houston Lighting & Power Co., 803 F. Supp. 1, 6 (S.D. Tex. 1992).
138. Vandeventer, 867 F. Supp. at 796; Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456
(N.D. Ill. 1988).

1996]

BEYOND SEX DISCRIMINATION

workplace cannot state a claim of sexual harassment if the conduct
does not create an anti-male environment. 139 For example, in Goluszek v. Smith, 4 ° the court stated that Title VII prohibited discrimina-

tion "stemming from an imbalance of power and abuse of that
imbalance by the powerful which results in discrimination against a
discrete and vulnerable group."14 ' As a result, the plaintiff must
prove not only that he was harassed because of his sex, but that males
were14 2treated as inferior in order to establish a claim under Title
VII.

In Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America,143 the Fifth Circuit barred
all same-sex sexual harassment claims.'" In Garcia, the court summarily stated: "[H]arassment by a male supervisor against a male
subordinate does not state a claim under Title VII even though the
harassment has sexual overtones. Title VII addresses gender discrimination."' 45 Therefore, the court found that the alleged behavior could
not constitute sexual harassment within the meaning of Title VII.'4
Bound by the Garcia decision, the Fifth Circuit recently upheld a
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer
where the plaintiff was subjected to a continuous stream of egregious
and abusive harassment by two fellow employees. 47 The court indicated that under Title VII, as long as the plaintiff demonstrates that
the harassment occurred because of the victim's sex, the respective
genders of the parties are irrelevant. 4 Nevertheless, because the
court could not overrule a prior panel's decision, 49 the court upheld
summary judgment for the employer. 50
Some courts also have used a "but-for" analysis to reject claims of
same-sex sexual harassment.' 5 ' In McWilliams v. Fairfax County
139. Vandeventer, 867 F. Supp. at 796; Goluszek,
140. 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. IM.1988).

697 F. Supp. at 1456.

141. Id- at 1456.
142. Id; see also Polly v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 803 F. Supp. 1, 6 (S.D.
Tex. 1992) (relying on the Goluszek court's rationale to deny a claim of same-sex
sexual harassment).
143. 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994).

144. Id-at 451-52.
145. Id (quoting Giddens v. Shell Oil Co., No. 92-8533 (5th Cir. Dec. 6, 1993)).
146. Id.
147. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996). In Oncale,

the plaintiff's harassment included being restrained physically while a coworker put
his penis on the plaintiff, having a bar of soap forced into his anus while he was showering, and being threatened with homosexual rape. Id. at 118-19.

148. Id. at 120.
149. In the Fifth Circuit, a panel cannot "overrule the decision, right or wrong, of a
prior panel in the absence of an intervening contrary or superceding decision by the
[c]ourt en banc or the Supreme Court." Id. (citing Pruitt v. Levi Strauss & Co., 932
F.2d 458, 465 (5th Cir. 1991)).
150. Id. at 119-21.
151. See, e.g., Martin v. Norfolk S. Ry., 926 F. Supp. 1044, 1049 (N.D. Ala. 1996)
(noting that in same-sex hostile work environment cases, "the facts ... do not provide

any assurance that the alleged conduct occurred because of the employee's gender";
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Board of Supervisors,152 the court held that Title VII does not prohibit
sexual harassment when the harasser and the victim are heterosexuals
of the same sex. 153 In McWilliams, coworkers teased the plaintiff
about his sexual activities, exposed themselves to him, and placed a
condom in his food.'14 On at least three occasions, the plaintiff's
hands were tied together and he was blindfolded and forced to his
knees, and once, a coworker put his finger in the plaintiff's mouth to
simulate an oral sex act.'5 5 In addition, two coworkers placed a
broomstick to the plaintiff's anus while another exposed his genitals to
the plaintiff.' 56 On one occasion, a coworker fondled the plaintiff
while he was working.' 57 Despite the egregious nature of the conduct,
the court found that because the harasser and the victim were heter58
osexuals of the same sex, there was no protection under Title VII.1
The court went on to say in a footnote, however, that if either of the
involved parties were homosexual, a recognizable claim for discrimination based on sex could be stated.' 59 As a result, in these cases, the
"but-for" requirement establishes an additional element for a prima
facie case of sexual harassment, i.e., in order to state a claim, a plain60
tiff must show that either he or she, or the harasser, is homosexual.
This judicial divergence regarding same-sex sexual harassment has
left some victims of sexual harassment without protection under Title
VII. Plaintiffs who are subjected to similar conduct have conditional
access to remedies; their relief depends on the district in which they
are located. Furthermore, such reasoning treats victims of same-sex
sexual harassment differently than victims of opposite-sex sexual harassment. Egregious, abusive behavior that clearly would constitute
sexual harassment if the harasser and the victim were of the opposite

therefore, "the presumption of sexual gratification and thus, sex discrimination,
ceases to exist"); Fox v. Sierra Dev. Co., 876 F. Supp. 1169, 1175 (D. Nev. 1995) (finding that "[a] work environment, saturated with sexual references, is potentially abusive or hostile to men and women in equal measure" and therefore is not

discriminatory on the basis of gender).
152. 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996).

153. IkL at 1195.
154. Id. at 1193.
155. I.
156. Idt
157. Ilt
158. Id. at 1195.
159. See id. at 1195 n.4.
160. See Gibson v. Tanks, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 1107, 1109 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (following
McWilliams, and thus concluding that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a

matter of law because there was no allegation or evidence that either party was homosexual); see also Wehren, supra note 77, at 122 (noting that the "but-for" requirement
"allows courts to interject the sexual orientation of the victim or the harasser to determine whether a same-gender claim is actionable").
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sex 16
might
be left unactionable merely because of the parties' same
1
sex.
B.

Bisexual Harassment

Although courts disagree with respect to same-sex sexual harassment, all of the courts that, in dicta, have addressed the issue, have
indicated that sexual harassment by a bisexual' 1 is not actionable
under Title VII. 163 Again, these courts have relied on a "but-for"
161. Martin v. Norfolk S. Ry., 926 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Ala. 1996), provides another
example of this anomalous result. The plaintiff in Martin alleged twenty-two separate
acts that, together, formed a course of harassment. Id at 1046-47. The most egregious
of these instances include having coworkers repeatedly grab at or swat the plaintiffs
genitals, being bent over by a co-worker while another one tried to stick a broom
handle into his anus, and being pinched. Id.
Clearly, if Martin and McWilliams had fit into the classic model of male-female
sexual harassment, such conduct would constitute hostile work environment sexual
harassment. In each case, however, the plaintiff was left without a remedy because his
harasser was of the same sex.
In cases such as these that involve unwanted physical contact, the plaintiffs certainly
have causes of action in tort for assault and battery, and possibly for intentional infliction of emotional distress. These torts, however, fail to address the full implications of
sexual harassment in the workplace. See infra note 229 and accompanying text (commenting on the inadequacy of a tort remedy for sexual harassment claims).
162. To date, there have been no reported cases involving a bisexual harasser who
harassed both men and women. Nevertheless, the hypothetical bisexual harasser illustrates another form of harassment that would be left unprotected under Title VII.
Bisexual harassment further demonstrates the need for sexual harassment legislation
that would protect victims of sexual harassment that does not constitute sex discrimination, but is nonetheless offensive sexual conduct that unreasonably alters the work
environment.
The importance of the hypothetical bisexual harasser is borne out by experience.
For example, prior to 1981, there were no same-sex harassment or equal opportunity
harassment cases. Since Wright v. Methodist Youth Servs., 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill.
1981), however, there have been a number of cases involving same-sex sexual harassment, see supra note 114, and as recently as 1993, the hypothetical equal opportunity
harasser became a reality in Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334 (D.
Wyo. 1993). See supra part III.A; infra part III.C. Before Chiapuzio, the equal opportunity harasser was just as much of a theoretical construct for analysis as the bisexual
harasser is today. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)
(reasoning that where the alleged conduct is equally offensive to both men and women, the "harassment would not be based upon sex because men and women are
accorded like treatment"); see also Johnson, supra note 82, at 742 n.85 (noting that the
bisexual harasser is a "hypothetical construct" that courts use in analyzing Title VII
sexual harassment cases). Therefore, it is possible that, in the future, there will be
claims of sexual harassment involving a bisexual harasser. Without an amendment to
Title VII or the enactment of federal sexual harassment legislation, those potential
victims' only recourse would be to quit their jobs or to accept their harasser's conduct
passively.
163. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1333 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(Bork, J., dissenting), afTd sub nom, Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57
(1986); Henson, 682 F.2d at 904; Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 n.7 (D.C. Cir.
1981); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977); McCoy v. Johnson
Controls World Servs., 878 F. Supp. 229,232 (S.D. Ga. 1995); Prescott v. Independent
Life & Accident Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1545, 1551 n.6 (M.D. Ala. 1995); cf.Tietgen v.
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analysis to determine that when both men and women are being
harassed, none are singled out because of their gender."6
In Barnes v. Costle, 65 the D.C. Circuit stated that a woman whose
job was conditioned upon submission to sexual advances was in fact
discriminated against as a result of sex, because, but for her sex, the
supervisor would not have sexually solicited her. 1 66 The court went on
to recognize that this condition was not altered in the case of femalemale harassment or homosexual same-sex harassment because, in
each case, the harassment would still result from the victim's gender. 167 In the case of a bisexual harasser who solicits both men and
women in exchange for job-related benefits, however, "the insistence
upon sexual favors would not constitute gender discrimination
be' 68
cause it would apply to male and female employees alike.'
Brown's Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1495, 1501 n.10 (E.D. Va. 1996) (reasoning that Title VII precludes protection from bisexual harassment "if one assumes
that a bisexual chooses whom to solicit for sex according to some criteria other than
gender" and noting that "this assumption may be false"); Chiapuzio, 826 F. Supp. at
1337 (differentiating between equal opportunity harassment which is prohibited under
Title VII and bisexual harassment which is not).
164. See Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620 ("[I]nstances of complained of sexual conduct
that prove equally offensive to male and female workers would not support a Title
VII sexual harassment charge because both men and women were accorded like treatment."); Vinson, 760 F.2d at 1333 n.7 (Bork, J., dissenting) ("[Tihis court holds that
only the differentiating libido runs afoul of Title VII, and bisexual harassment, however blatant and however offensive and disturbing, is legally permissible."); Henson,
682 F.2d at 904 ("In [bisexual harassment] cases, the sexual harassment would not be
based upon sex because men and women are accorded like treatment.... [Therefore]
the plaintiff would have no remedy under Title VII."); Bundy, 641 F.2d at 942 n.7
("Only by a reductio ad absurdum could we imagine a case of harassment that is not
sex discrimination-where a bisexual supervisor harasses men and women alike.");
Barnes, 561 F.2d at 990 n.55 ("In the case of a bisexual superior, the insistence upon
sexual favors would not constitute gender discrimination because it would apply to
male and female employees alike."); McCoy, 878 F. Supp. at 232 ("[Slexual harassment of any kind is in fact 'based upon sex' and is considered sexual discrimination,
except where the harasser is bisexual and subjects men and women to the same treatment ...."); Prescott,878 F. Supp. at 1551 n.6 ("Interestingly, if a supervisor, male or

female, created a hostile environment for all of the employees, this would not technically violate Title VII. There would be harassment, but it would not be based on
gender."); see also Johnson, supra note 82, at 734 ("[S]exual advances made toward
men and women alike are not sexual harassment but-for a person's gender and, therefore, are not within the purview of Title VII's proscriptions."); Wehren, supra note 77,
at 121 ("[S]ame-gender sexual harassment claims involving a bisexual or equal opportunity harasser have been denied because courts do not deem such conduct to satisfy
the 'but-for' test."); cf. Chiapuzio, 826 F. Supp. at 1337 ("Where a harasser violates
both men and women, 'it is not unthinkable to argue that each individual who is
harassed is being treated badly because of their sex."' (quoting John J. Donahue,
Review Essay: Advocacy Versus Analysis in Assessing Employment Discrimination
Law, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1583, 1611 n.134 (1992))).
165. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
166. ld at 990.
167. Id at 990 n.55.
168. Id.
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Almost ten years later, the Sixth Circuit in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 6 9 addressed a claim of hostile work environment sexual
harassment of a female employee. 170 In recognizing such a claim
under Title VII, the court held that to sustain a hostile work environment claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the conduct was because of her sex. 17 1 Thus, the court noted, "instances of complained of
sexual conduct that prove equally offensive to male and female workers would not support a Title VII sexual harassment charge because
both men and women were accorded like treatment."' 17
The Rabidue court's reasoning precludes a broader range of cases
under Title VII than Barnes and potentially leaves even more victims
unprotected. 73 While Barnes states that a bisexual would not discriminate based on gender, Rabidue forecloses coverage of a heterosexual's harassment of both men and women-the equal opportunity
harasser174 -- because the court considers "harassment perpetrated by
any person against both men and women [to be] beyond Title VII's
coverage."' 175 Thus, under both courts' reasoning, when either a bisex169. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cerL denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 620.
172. Id.; see also Prescott v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp.
1545, 1551 n.6 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (noting that if a hostile work environment offended
both men and women, there would be no violation of Title VII because the harassment would not be because of gender).
173. See Wehren, supra note 77, at 101. For instance, Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating
Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Wyo. 1993), in which the court held that heterosexual
harassment of both men and women was actionable because of the different nature of
the harassment directed at each, see infra part III.C, presumably would have come out
differently under the reasoning in Rabidue. Because the conduct in Chiapuzio,
although different in nature, was equally offensive, the men and women were -accorded like treatment." Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620. Therefore, Title VII would not
apply. Id.
174. In contrast to a bisexual harasser, an equal opportunity harasser is a heterosexual who nonetheless harasses both men and women with gender-driven conduct.
See Chiapuzio, 826 F. Supp. at 1336-37 (noting the distinction between a bisexual
harasser and an "equal opportunity harasser"); Johnson, supra note 82, at 733-34
("The equal opportunity harasser makes gender-driven comments to subordinates of
both sexes with an intent to demean and harm them because of their maleness or
femaleness. The bisexual harasser makes unwanted sexual overtures to subordinates
of both genders." (footnotes omitted)); infra part III.C (discussing Chiapuzio which
recently allowed a claim of equal opportunity harassment).
175. Wehren, supra note 77, at 101. The more sweeping analysis in Rabidue most
likely results from the fact that the plaintiff alleged a hostile work environment rather
than a quid pro quo claim as in Barnes. The Barnes analysis rests on the assumption
that someone who sexually propositions both males and females is in fact bisexual,
whereas this assumption is not necessary in the case of hostile work environment
sexual harassment. Conduct creating a hostile work environment may have nothing
to do with sexual attraction, and therefore, a heterosexual may harass members of
both genders. Other courts have recognized the distinction and excluded both from
Title VII's protection. See, eg., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir.
1982) (noting that, in cases where "a supervisor makes sexual overtures to workers of
both sexes or where the conduct complained of is equally offensive to male and female workers," there is no remedy under Title VII).
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ual or a heterosexual harasses both men and women, the "harassment
literally is 'nondiscriminatory."" 76
Although the bisexual harasser has yet to materialize in a Title VII
sexual harassment case, the underlying rationale of bisexual harassment exposes another type of harassment that, although harmful and
offensive, does not fit into the sexual harassment as sex discrimination
framework. Thus, bisexual harassment illustrates another potential
class of victims who would have no remedy for their sexual harassment 177 and the need for sexual harassment legislation. Although Title VII has proven to be a powerful tool for many victims of sexual
harassment, not all forms of sexual harassment constitute sex discrimination. In these unprotected cases, however, the harassment is just as
abusive and demoralizing, and warrants legislation that recognizes the
harmful effects on the victims and provides the victims with a remedy.
C. The Equal Opportunity Harasser
Unlike a bisexual harasser who is motivated by sexual attraction for
both sexes, an "equal opportunity harasser" is a heterosexual who,
irrespective of his or her sexual proclivities, engages in offensive sexual behavior towards both men and women. 178 The same rationale
courts use to determine that bisexual harassment would not be prohibited under Title VII would seemingly preclude equal opportunity
harassment claims as well because men and women would be accorded like treatment.
In Chiapuzio v. BLT OperatingCorp.,'179 however, the court circumvented the "but-for" requirement and held that equal opportunity sexual harassment is within Title VII's purview.' 80 In Chiapuzio, the
supervisor, Eddie Bell, subjected both male and female employees, as
well as one employee's non-employee wife, to a stream of sexual
abuse. 8 ' Bell emphasized his sexual prowess to the men, and suggested that he "could do a better job of making love to [their wives]
than [they] could."' 82 In addition, Bell made sexually abusive remarks
176. George, supra note 107, at 31.
177. The possibility of a bisexual harassment case increases with the growing
awareness, acceptance, and in certain states and cities, protection of sexual orientation because more individuals will feel comfortable to reveal their sexual orientation.
See infra notes 250-51 and accompanying text (listing states that do and do not have
laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation). This result has
already occurred in the case of same-sex sexual harassment, which prior to the 1980s
was not a widely litigated form of harassment, but since has been extensively litigated
and widely debated.
178. See supra note 174.
179. 826 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Wyo. 1993).
180. Id. at 1338.
181. Id. at 1335.
182. Id.
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to the women, including on one occasion offering Bean's wife one
hundred dollars to sit on his lap.' s 3
The Chiapuzio court characterized Bell as an "equal-opportunity"
harasser who used gender-driven remarks, rather than a bisexual harasser.184 The court further stated that "the equal harassment of both
genders does not escape the purview of Title VII, ' 'l a Bell described
to the females sexual acts he desired to perform with them."s He
never, however, directed such descriptions to the male employees. 18
Instead, he made comments about his superior sexual abilities, often
in front of the plaintiffs' wives and other employees.' s Unlike a bisexual harasser, Bell's conduct indicated that he "intended to demean
and, therefore, harm" the plaintiffs because each was male. 1 9 As a
result, the court reasoned that "the nature of Bell's remarks indicate[d] that he harassed the plaintiffs because of their gender and constitute[d] exactly the type of harassment contemplated to fall within
the purview of Title VII."''
In effect, the Chiapuzio court isolated the plaintiff's claims and
found each to be based on gender.19 ' The court conducted a comparative analysis and found that, despite the fact that all of the defendant's
conduct was sexual in nature, the remarks made to the males were
qualitatively different from those directed to the females.'9 Thus, the
183. Il For a more detailed description of the facts of Chiapuzio, see Johnson,
supra note 82, at 739-40 & nn.54-72.
184. 826 F. Supp. at 1337; see supra note 174 (distinguishing between a bisexual
harasser and an equal opportunity harasser).
185. 826 F. Supp. at 1337; see Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459 (9th
Cir. 1994). Steiner involved a case of male-female harassment. In discussing the female plaintiff's claim, however, the court left open the possibility of viable sexual
harassment claims for both men and women:
[E]ven if Trenkle used sexual epithets equal in intensity and in an equally
degrading manner against male employees, he cannot thereby "cure" his
conduct toward women.... [A]lthough words from a man to a man are
differently received than words from a man to a woman, we do not rule out
the possibility that both men and women working at Showboat have viable
claims against Trenkle for sexual harassment.
Steiner, 25 F.3d at 1464.
Like the court in Chiapuzio, the Steiner court's analysis also focused on the different nature of the harassment directed at the women from that directed at the men. Id.
at 1463 ("Trenkle was indeed abusive to men, but ... his abuse of women was different."). As a result, the court determined that the plaintiff was harassed because of her
gender. Id. at 1464.
186. Chiapuzio, 826 F. Supp. at 1338.
187. Id188. Id
189. Id. at 1337.
190. Id. at 1338.
191. See Johnson, supra note 82, at 742-43 (discussing the compartmentalization of
claims in Chiapuzio).
192. Chiapuzio, 826 F. Supp. at 1338.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

abuse in each case was gender-driven. 193 As a result, the court held
that the plaintiffs stated a cause of action under Title VII. 194
Although this reasoning allowed a seemingly just result, its theoretical justification is unsound.'95 Primarily, the reasoning appears contrived to engineer a fair outcome. The Chiapuzio court separated the
conduct aimed at the females from that directed at the males; both,
however, were subjected to continuous sexually abusive comments in
front of other employees. 196 Essentially, the court neglected to consider the workplace as a whole. Analyzing the women's claims separately from the men's claims departs from, and effectively eliminates,
the traditionally strict "but-for" requirement, because such a requirement focuses on the treatment of both sexes to determine that one sex
was treated differently than the other sex.'" By separating the plaintiffs' claims, the court overlooks that both the men and the women
were subjected to verbal sexual abuse. The distinction between what
Bell said to each gender seems arbitrary; in the end, both were subjected to a similar form of harassment. In each case, the intent and
the method were the same: Bell intended to demean both the men
and the women, and he did so through sexual jokes and comments.
Because both men and women were treated equally, albeit abusively,
there is no discrimination based on sex under the judiciary's differential analysis.' 98
Furthermore, the separate analysis of male and female plaintiffs'
claims could prove to be inadequate in certain situations. A harasser
potentially could harass both men and women in a similar manner,
193. Id
194. Id

195. See Johnson, supra note 82, at 743 (stating that the Chiapuzio decision rests on

"unstable ground").

196. Id at 746 ("By separating the plaintiffs into separate gender groups, the court

declined to analyze the plaintiffs as a class.... [and therefore] easily concluded that

Bell harassed each because of his or her gender and overlooked the more complicated
issue of law, namely, that Bell harassed employees of both genders.").

197. Id. at 743. Johnson notes that the elimination of the "but-for" requirement,
which results from the rationale in Chiapuzio, would permit plaintiffs who were
harassed because of their sexual orientations to state a claim under Title VII without
having to prove that the harassment was based on their gender. Id. at 747. Instead,
such plaintiffs would simply have to show that "their harassers harassed them with
gender-driven remarks characterized to harm them because they are men." Id. Under
the current state of the law, however, it is well-established that harassment based on
the victim's sexual orientation is not actionable. See Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290,
1992 WL 5436, at *6-7 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc.,

608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979); see also EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 615.2(b)(3) (stat-

ing that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation). Indeed, Congress has repeatedly refused to amend Title VII to include discrimination
based on sexual orientation. See supra note 80. Thus, the Chiapuzio court's holding
contradicts a well-settled and established line of case law and legislative history.
198. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (discussing cases that preclude a
finding of discrimination based on sex when both men and women are subjected to a
hostile work environment).
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subjecting them to abusive remarks, simulating sexual acts, physically
touching them, and even sexually propositioning each of them. Utilizing the Chiapuzio court's analysis would require an investigation into
the harasser's motivations to determine whether the harassment was
gender-driven. 199 The harasser's motive in each case, however, may
be different-the harasser may be trying to belittle the men, while
trying to get the women to submit to sexual acts with him. On an
external level, however, the conduct is substantially similar in each
case.2 "0 Therefore, by requiring an investigation into the harasser's
motivations, inconsistent outcomes may result for harassment victims
subjected to substantially similar conduct.
Finally, separating sexual harassment claims along gender lines continues to leave the situation of a bisexual harasser outside the protection of Title VII.2 1 Because a bisexual harasser would subject both
males and females to the same type of harassment and would have the
same motivations for harassing both sexes, the harassment of each
would not be different in nature. Therefore, the harassment would
not be gender-driven. Instead, the sexual harassment of both men and
women would be permissible. Thus, even where a court would allow a
claim of sexual harassment by an equal opportunity harasser, the reasoning provides questionable support for future similar claims and
continues to leave whole categories of sexual harassment without
protection.
D. Sexual HarassmentBased on Sexual Orientation
In addition, courts unanimously have held that Title VII does not
include discrimination based on sexual orientation or sexual iden199. Despite the obvious difficulties of such an investigation with regard to time,
there is also the difficulty of probing the harasser's motives. Although motivation is
always an issue in Title VII actions, if a harasser knows that purely equal, non-genderdriven harassment is not prohibited, the harasser could easily tailor both his harassment, and/or his testimony regarding the harassment and his motivations, to protect
himself from liability. See supra note 19.
200. See Murphy, supra note 123, at 1148-49. As Murphy notes:
[S]ituations may arise in which the nature of the harassment experienced by
members of both genders is indistinguishable.... In such scenarios, one
could not characterize the conduct as discrimination on the basis of gender.
If,
in fact, the nature of the harassment were indistinguishable, alternative
remedies would be more appropriate.
Id.
201. Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334, 1337 (D. Wyo. 1993)
(noting a "critical difference" between the equal opportunity harasser who -intend[s]
to demean and, therefore, harm" the male victims, and the "theoretical bisexual harasser" who presumably does not have a discriminatory motive towards either sex because he or she is attracted to both sexes); see also Johnson, supra note 82, at 734
(noting that although the Chiapuzio court found equal opportunity harassment to be
prohibited under Title VII, "the court implied that Title VII did not prohibit bisexual
harassment because the harassment of both men and women was not done 'but-for'
the individual's sex" (footnote omitted)).
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tity.202 This result is due to the judiciary's narrow interpretation of
"sex," and the plaintiffs' consequential inability to fulfill the "but-for"
requirement.
In Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,2° 3 the Seventh Circuit held that
discrimination based on transsexuality 20 4 was not prohibited under Title VII.2 °5 The Ulane court focused on the lack of legislative history
regarding the prohibition of discrimination based on sex, and concluded that, in the absence of clear legislative direction, statutory
words must be given their plain meaning.20 6 Thus, the court held that
Title VII proscribed discrimination because someone was a woman or
a man, but not because someone had a "sexual identity disorder, i.e., a
person born with a male body who believes himself to be female, or'20 a7
person born with a female body who believes herself to be male.
In addition, the Ulane court noted that there were several attempts
to amend Title VII to include protection from discrimination based on
"affectational or sexual orientation," each of which failed. 208 Further202. See, e.g., DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th Cir.
1979) (emphasizing that Congress has refused to extend Title VII's protection to harassment based on sexual preference and concluding that Title VII only applies to
discrimination based on gender); Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 327
(5th Cir. 1978) (refusing to extend Title VII to prohibit discrimination based on sexual
preference); Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Medical Ctr., 403 F. Supp. 456, 457 (N.D. Cal.
1975) (noting that Title VII contains "[n]o mention.., of sexual preference"), aff'd,
570 F.2d 354 (1978); see also Carolyn Grose, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment: Subverting
the Heterosexist Paradigmof Title VII, 7 Yale J.L. & Feminism 375, 388 (1995) (commenting that neither the judiciary nor Congress is "eager to extend Title VII's protection to gay men and lesbians any time soon"); Waks & Steinberg, supra note 118, at
B6 (recognizing the "well-established precedent that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination purely on the basis of sexual orientation or preference").
203. 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
204. The court defined transsexualism as "a condition that exists when a physiologically normal person (Le., not a hermaphrodite... ) experiences discomfort or discontent about nature's choice of his or her particular sex and prefers to be the other sex."
Id at 1083 n.3. The court distinguished transsexuals from homosexuals, "who are
sexually attracted to persons of the same sex, and transvestites, who are generally
male heterosexuals who cross-dress.., for sexual arousal rather than social comfort;
both [of which] are content with the sex into which they were born." Id. Recognizing
the difference between transsexuals, transvestites, and homosexuals, the court concluded that the same reasoning excludes protection for all three. Id. at 1085.
205. Id at 1084; accord Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir.
1982) (focusing on congressional intent and the plain meaning of sex, and thus finding
that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based on transsexuality); Holloway v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662-63 (9th Cir. 1977) (same); James v. Ranch
Mart Hardware, Inc., 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1338, 1339 (D. Kan. 1994)
(same); Dobre v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284, 286 (E.D. Pa.
1993) (same); Doe v. United States Postal Serv., 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1867,
1868-69 (D.D.C. 1985) (same); Terry v. EEOC, 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1395,
1396-97 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (same); Powell v. Read's, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 369, 370-71 (D.
Md. 1977) (same); Voyles, 403 F. Supp. at 457 (same).
206. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085.
207. Id
208. Id; see Sommers, 667 F.2d at 750 (noting that three bills proposing to amend
the Civil Rights Act to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual preference were
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more, Congress's rejection of such an extension occurred after courts
had excluded protection for transsexuals. 20 9 The court also found that
even though Title VII, as a remedial statute, should be construed
broadly, the statute cannot be interpreted contrary to legislative intent.210 Instead, only Congress can
extend to transsexuals protection
21
from discrimination based on sex. '
In DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co.,21 2 the Ninth Circuit relied on Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co. 21 3 and held that
"sex" as used in Title VII "should not be judicially extended to include sexual preference such as homosexuality."'2' 4 Like the Ulane
court, the DeSantis court focused on the lack of congressional intent
indicating any interpretation other than a traditional construction of
sex, 21 5 and concluded that such an interpretation did not include sexual orientation.21 6
Title VII by its terms does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. 21 7 In addition, courts have refused to make such an
extension through a broad interpretation of sex that would include
sexual orientation. 21s As a result, sexual orientation harassment does
not fit into the paradigm of sexual harassment as sex discrimination.
Short of an amendment to Title VII219 to include sexual orientation,"
presented to the 94th Congress and seven were presented to the 95th Congress, all of
which were defeated).
209. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1086.
210. Id; see Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977).
In Holloway, the court also noted that despite the lack of legislative intent regarding
"sex" in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the amendments in 1972 reflected the "clear
intent" of Congress "to remedy the economic deprivation of women as a class....
[and] place women on an equal footing with men." Id. at 662 (citation omitted).
211. 742 F.2d at 1086.
212. 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
213. 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977).
214. 608 F.2d at 329-30.
215. Id at 329.
216. Id at 330.
217. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
219. As noted, such an amendment is unlikely, at least in the near future. See supra
note 80 and accompanying text.
220. Carolyn Grose notes that the exclusion of protection on the basis of sexual
orientation makes Title VII a "double-edged sword for lesbians and gay men [in the
context of same-sex sexual harassment]: as plaintiffs, they fall outside the universe of
its protection, while, as alleged harassers, they fall squarely within its universe of liability." Grose, supra note 202, at 393. Grose thus concludes that, unless Title VII is
amended to include sexual orientation, the statute should not be used to regulate
same-sex sexual harassment. Id at 388. The current regulation of same-sex sexual
harassment, which is not prohibited if based on sexual orientation, sends an impermissible message that
it is okay to make a workplace miserable for a dyke or a faggot, or for someone who looks or acts like a dyke or a faggot, but it is not okay to make a
workplace miserable for a straight man or woman, or for someone who looks
or acts like a straight man or woman.
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the most effective way to address these unprotected forms of sexual
harassment is to enact federal sexual harassment legislation. Because
the legislation would focus on conduct rather than discrimination, the
genders and sexual orientations of the parties would be irrelevant for
a claim of sexual harassment.
IV.

TITLE

VII

AND FEDERAL SEXUAL HARASSMENT LEGISLATION

Title VII has developed into a broad and effective tool against sex
discrimination. In many cases, sexual harassment fits within the Title
VII framework, protecting individuals from demeaning sexual conduct directed at them because of their sex. Other types of sexual harassment, however, such as harassment based on sexual orientation and
bisexual harassment, and possibly same-sex and equal opportunity
harassment, do not constitute sex discrimination. These forms of harassment, however, are nonetheless abusive and demoralizing for the
victims."2 ' This part emphasizes the need for federal sexual harassment legislation and suggests a framework that eliminates the "butfor" requirement and tracks the EEOC Guidelines on sexual harassment. In addition, this part discusses the evaluation of sexual harassment claims under Title VII and proposes an analytical framework for
claims under the legislation based on a reconfiguration of Title VII
standards which would address other impediments to sexual harassment claims that exist under Title VII.
A. The Need for Federal Sexual Harassment Legislation
The right to be free from sexual harassment in the workplace
should not depend upon the sexual orientation of the harasser or victim, the motivation for the harassment, or differential treatment between the sexes. Under the "but-for" requirement and the current
definition of "sex," victims of sexual orientation harassment are not
protected under Title VII.12 In addition, victims of bisexual harassment, and possibly same-sex and equal-opportunity harassment 22 3 are
Id. Thus, in the absence of an amendment to Title VII, federal sexual harassment
legislation would effectively protect against sexual harassment while addressing these
issues.
221. See infra note 224 and accompanying text (noting that same-sex and equal
opportunity sexual harassment are no less harmful to the victims than opposite-sex
sexual harassment).
222. See supra part III.D. As Samuel Marcosson notes, homosexuals are "unprotected by the law, and subject to whatever prejudices society (in forms such as sodomy
laws) and individuals (in forms such as gay-bashing and harassment on the job) may
decide to inflict." Marcosson, supra note 103, at 38; see also Torkildsen Promises
Hearings on Measure to Ban Sexual Orientation Discrimination, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 54, at A-2 (Mar. 20, 1996) ("[G]ays and lesbians are the 'last group subjected to legal discrimination on the job' .... " (quoting Senator Jim Jeffords)).
223. Although a claim of equal opportunity harassment has been found actionable,
the court's reasoning is unsound, and thus provides questionable support for future
claims. See supra part III.C.
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left without protection under Title VII, even though such conduct is
equally offensive and interferes with the workplace as much as, if not
more than, classic forms of sexual harassment.2 4 These individuals
would be forced to "run a gauntlet of sexual abuse" in exchange for
the privilege of working because their harassment does not constitute
discrimination based on sex.' Thus, in order to achieve full equality
in the workplace, these forms of sexual harassment should be protected to the same extent as traditional types of sexual harassment. 6
B.

Inadequacy of a Tort Remedy

More than one commentator has argued that sexual harassment
should be addressed through the use of tort law as an alternative or
supplement to Title VII. 27 In particular, at least one commentator
has asserted that sexual harassment should be taken out of Title VII
Separating
and that a tort of sexual harassment should be created.'
sexual harassment from sex discrimination, however, ignores the fact
that sexual harassment often results from issues of power and domination, and is often used as a tool to emphasize and perpetuate women's
secondary status in the workplace. Catharine MacKinnon has re224. See, Levitsky, supra note 77, at 1014 (noting that "victims of equal opportunity
and same-sex sexual harassment suffer no less an injury from sexual harassment than
victims of opposite-sex sexual harassment"); Murphy, supra note 123, at 1146 (stating
that "unwelcome sexual advances, ridicule, intimidation, and other harassing acts are
no less injurious and degrading to someone of the harasser's same gender than they
are to an individual of the opposite gender").
225. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982).
226. Carolyn Grose has commented that, without specific provisions for sexual orientation, any protection that might exist for lesbians and homosexuals under Title VII
is "illusory and dangerous," because those protections are afforded on heterosexual
terms. Grose, supra note 202, at 397. Accordingly, Grose concludes that "[w]hether
[a] statute takes the form of an expanded Title VII or a new piece of stand-alone
legislation governing sexuality in the workplace, it must prohibit discrimination and
harassment on the basis of sexual orientation." Id. Although the proposed federal
sexual harassment legislation will not specifically protect against sexual orientation
discrimination, the statute removes gender and sexual orientation from the analytical
framework, and thus addresses all forms of sexual harassment, including harassment
based on homosexuality or sexual identity.
227. See, e.g., Terry M. Dworkin et al., Theories of Recovery for Sexual Harassment:
Going Beyond Title VII, 25 San Diego L. Rev. 125, 137-46 (1988) (noting that tort
causes of action are "attractive" options for victims of sexual harassment despite the
availability of Title VII); Jane P. Mallor, DiscriminatoryDischargeand the Emerging
Common Law of Wrongftd Discharge,28 Ariz. L. Rev. 651, 655-68 (1986) (suggesting
the use of common law wrongful discharge actions as a viable remedy that does not
conflict with, but instead facilitates the goals of Title VII); Note, Legal Remedies for
Employment-Related Sexual Harassment, 64 Minn. L. Rev. 151, 167 (1979) (noting
that tort remedies provide "realistic alternatives" for victims of sexual harassment);
Krista J.Schoenheider, Note, A Theory of Tort Liabilityfor Sexual Harassmentin the
Workplace, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1461, 1485-94 (1986) (proposing a tort of sexual harassment that focuses on "unreasonable interference with an individual employee's right
to work in an environment free from sex-based intimidation or hostility," and utilizes
a reasonable woman standard to determine recovery).
228. See Paul, supra note 19, at part IHI.
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jected the tort approach because it fails to recognize the injury sexual
harassment causes to women as a group, and instead treats sexual harassment as a harm perpetrated against an individual."2 9 Furthermore,
2 30
the tort approach turns sexual harassment into an issue of morality
as opposed to an issue of "economic coercion, in which material survival is held hostage to sexual submission."231 Because sexual harassment is "a social wrong and a social injury
that occurs on a personal
32
level," the tort approach is inadequate.?
Moreover, even if a tort of sexual harassment were used in the limited context of those cases that are outside Title VII's protection, or as
an alternate cause of action, a tort remedy would still fail to adequately protect victims of sexual harassment. Primarily, a tort of sexual harassment would render sexual harassment claims unreasonably
difficult to maintain. For instance, Professor Ellen Frankel Paul proposes a tort of sexual harassment modeled after the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress.3 3 In order to establish a hostile work
environment sexual harassment claim under Paul's tort of sexual harassment, the conduct would have to be "extreme and outrageous,"
229. MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 172; see also Christopher P. Barton, Note, Between the Boss and a Hard Place: A Consideration of Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vimson and the Law of Sexual Harassment,67 B.U. L. Rev. 445, 466 (1987) (noting
that "the use of tort theory undercuts the goals of Title VII by ignoring the more
pervasive problem of discrimination and instead claiming that the harm is the result of
an individual act"); Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment
Under Title VII, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1449, 1463 (1984) ("[T]ort damages alone do not
acknowledge that sexual harassment injures a discrete and identifiable group by subjecting its victims to demeaning treatment and relegating them to inferior status in the
workplace.").
In her discussion of the use of tort law as a remedy for sexual harassment, MacKinnon refers to traditional torts such as assault, battery, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress and notes that "short of developing a new tort for sexual harassment as such, the tort approach misses the nexus between women's sexuality and
women's employment." MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 171. A proposed tort of sexual
harassment that recognizes such a nexus, however, still treats sexual harassment as an
individual injury. See Paul, supra note 19, at 336 (proposing a tort of sexual harassment that "emanates from the 'individual-rights perspective,"' as opposed to the
"'group-rights perspective' MacKinnon endorses"). As a result, even a tort specifically tailored to sexual harassment fails to address the full implications of sexual harassment in the workplace. As MacKinnon recognized, because the tort approach
forces a choice between sexual harassment as an injury to the person or an injury to
the job, when it is in fact both, a tort perspective "omits the social dynamics that
systematically place women in these positions, that may coerce consent, that interpenetrate sexuality and employment to women's detriment because they are women."
MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 171.
230. See id. at 173 (stating that "tort sees sexual harassment as an illicit act, a moral
infraction, an outrage to the individual's sensibilities and the society's cherished but
unlived values").
231. IL But see Minson, supra note 102, at 88-89 (criticizing MacKinnon's view of
the tort approach for failing to view anti-discrimination legislation as "one regulatory
vehicle among others" that is compatible with tort law).
232. MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 173.
233. See Paul supra note 19, at 359-63.
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and the victim would have to suffer "extreme emotional distress."-,
In her proposal, Paul defines the terms consistently with traditional
tort law, requiring that conduct be "so outrageous in character, and so
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency,
and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community.""2 Such a standard would render it almost impossible to
establish an actionable claim of sexual harassment. The difficulty of
meeting such a strict requirement is seen in cases where plaintiffs assert both Title VII and intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims. 36
In Harley v. McCoach,'2 37 the court noted that the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit "has recognized that conduct in the employment
23
context almost never gives rise to recovery under this tort theory."
Generally, the Third Circuit requires an "extra factor" to find conduct
outrageous in the employment context. 239 Specifically, an employer
must have subjected the employee to both sexual harassment and retaliation for rejecting sexual propositions.2 '1 For example, in James v.
IBM Corp.,241 the court found that the plaintiff failed to raise a factual
issue regarding her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim
despite her subjection to two years of joking and harassment, and being called a "bitch" on two occasions. 2z Thus, although the court denied summary judgment with respect to the plaintiffs Title VII claim,
the court granted summary judgment to the employer with respect to
intentional infliction of emotional distress.2 43

Furthermore, Title VII sexual harassment claims, under current judicially established parameters, are already difficult to maintain.2 "
234. Id. at 361-63.

235. I& at 361 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965)); see also Hardy v.
Fleming Food Cos., No. H-94-3759, 1996 WL 145463, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 1996)

(noting that severe distress is an element of the tort rather than just a matter of damages, and that "[t]he law intervenes only where the distress is so severe that no reasonable person should be expected to endure it" (citation omitted)).
236. See Harley v. McCoach, 928 F. Supp. 533, 542 (E.D. Pa. 1996); see also Woodhouse, supra note 19, at 1184 (proposing a tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress as a remedy for same-sex sexual harassment, but admitting that "the standards for a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress are difficult
to establish"). Although the standards for sexual harassment and intentional infliction of emotional distress are different, plaintiffs commonly assert both causes of action because the plaintiff could potentially meet both standards in egregious cases of

sexual harassment, e.g., where the employer knew of the conduct and failed to take
action, and the harassment resulted in the plaintiff's severe emotional distress.
237. 928 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Pa. 1996).

238. Id. at 542.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. 737 F. Supp. 1420, 1427-28 (E.D. Pa. 1990).

242. Id.
243. Id.
244. See, eg., George, supra note 107, at 18 ("If proving a quid pro quo case is
difficult, the legal obstacles in the hostile work environment victim's path are almost
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Paul's approach, however, suggests an even heightened standard for
sexual harassment claimants. "Extreme and outrageous" conduct requires more offensive conduct to establish a claim than is necessary
under Title VII. As a result, the tort requirement that the victim suffer economic detriment and/or extreme emotional distress all but forecloses hostile work environment claims which, by definition, result in
an unreasonably abusive work environment rather than economic detriment.24 5 As the law stands, psychological injury is not necessary to
establish a sexual harassment claim. 24 6 The standard Paul proposes

would almost require "the harassing conduct to lead[ ] to a nervous
breakdown" before a victim would have a valid claim of sexual harassment, a requirement which the Supreme Court clearly has rejected. 47
The criterion of severe emotional distress is extremely difficult to
meet, and would require victims to stay in abusive and hostile environments until their psyches have been sufficiently harmed to meet
such a high standard.248
Moreover, placing the regulation of sexual harassment at the state
level risks unequal protection for victims of sexual harassment. States
may or may not 249 enact sexual harassment statutes, and those that do
insurmountable in all but the most extreme cases-and sometimes not even then.");
Oshige, supra note 77, at 576 (arguing that the unwelcomeness requirement is "gratuitous in theory and vicious in practice" and that the severe or pervasive standard "creates a perverse safety zone in which women may be subjected to gender-based
discriminatory treatment for which Title VII offers no remedy").
245. See Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-68 (1986) (holding that
Title VII is not limited to "'economic' or 'tangible' discrimination," but instead includes discrimination resulting from a hostile or abusive work environment).
246. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-23 (1993). Woodhouse also
imposes such a requirement in her proposal: "This cause of action would... provide
adequate compensation for those who truly are emotionally damaged by the sexual
harassment.... ." Woodhouse, supra note 19, at 1184. Emotional damage suggests a
requirement of psychological harm, again, an unnecessary element of sexual
harassment.
247. Harris,510 U.S. at 21-23.
248. Although this Note asserts that an alternate framework is necessary to address
certain forms of sexual harassment that currently are not covered by Title VII, it does
not propose a statute that requires an emotional collapse before a victim has a remedy. Paul's proposal would make it even more difficult to establish a claim of sexual
harassment rather than provide even-handed coverage for those victims whose sexual
harassment does not constitute sex discrimination.
249. Recent controversies over anti-gay initiatives suggest a strong likelihood that
not all states will enact statutes protecting homosexuals from discrimination in the
workplace. These conflicts indicate that the equal protection of all citizens, regardless
of sexual orientation, lacks universal support among the states. See Suzanne B.
Goldberg, Gay Rights Through the Looking Glass: Politics, Morality and the Trial of
Colorado'sAmendment 2, 21 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1057 (1994) (discussing the trial of
Evans v. Romer and Colorado's constitutional amendment prohibiting laws that protected against discrimination based on sexual orientation). Although the Supreme
Court, in Romer v. Evans, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (1996), held such actions unconstitutional as
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, id. at 1629, Colorado's passage of a constitutional amendment prohibiting any laws that protect homosexuals from discrimination demonstrates the existing animus against homosexuals and the dangers of leaving
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may provide varying levels of protection. Causes of action would then
depend on the state in which an individual works-conduct which
constituted illegal harassment in one state might be completely legal
in another. Disparity between available state remedies has already

occurred in the context of protections against discrimination based on
sexual orientation. While homosexuals presently have protection

from discrimination in some states,250 they do not in others."5

Fur-

protection at the state level. The Supreme Court found that Colorado's amendment

"withdr[ew] from homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection from the injuries caused by discrimination, and it forbids reinstatement of these laws and policies."
Id. at 1625. The amendment stripped these rights in no uncertain terms:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments,
nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices
or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any
person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination.
Colo. Const. art. II, § 30b (1992).
Colorado is not the only state to have entertained such a proposal. Oregon's Measure 9, a similar action, would have additionally "declared homosexuality to be 'abnormal, wrong, unnatural and perverse."' Goldberg, supra, at 1058 (quoting Timothy
Egan, Anti-Gay Backlashes Are on 3 States' Ballots, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1992, § 4, at
4). Even after the Colorado district court declared that Amendment 2 was unconstitutional, attempts were made in Arizona, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, and
Washington to place anti-gay initiatives on November, 1994 ballots. Goldberg, supra,
at 1081 & n.146. Only two passed. Id. at 1081 n.146. Even where similar initiatives
have failed, however, the number of voters supporting the proposals is alarming. See
Cincinnati Council Removes Sexual Orientation from Rights Law, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 49, at A-6 (Mar. 14, 1995) (reporting that sixty-two percent of voters in
Cincinnati passed an initiative to bar laws providing protection from discrimination
based on sexual orientation); Maine Voters Block Restriction on Rights Laws, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 217, at A-13 (Nov. 9, 1995) (noting that an anti-gay initiative
was rejected in Maine with fifty-three percent in favor of rejection and forty-seven
percent against rejection); cf. Fla. City's Discrimination Ordinance Retained, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at A-12 (Jan. 13, 1995) (reporting that fifty-six percent of
West Palm Beach voters voted to retain an ordinance prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation). Thus, even where these actions were defeated, as
much as forty-seven percent of the voters favored the initiatives. As a result, it is
unlikely that all states will enact laws prohibiting sexual harassment on the basis of
sexual orientation. In order to fully and equally protect homosexuals from discrimination in the workplace, such action must be taken at the federal level.
250. See Cal. Lab. Code § 1102.1(a) (West 1996) ("Sections 1101 and 1102 prohibit
discrimination or different treatment in any aspect of employment or opportunity ...
based on actual or perceived sexual orientation."); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46a-81c
(West 1995) (prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of an individual's
sexual orientation); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 151B, § 4 (West 1996) (same); Minn.
Stat. Ann. § 363.03 (West 1996) (same); NJ. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12 (West 1993 & Supp.
1996) (same); R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-7 (1995) (same); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 495
(1995) (same); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111.36(1)(d)(1) (\Vest 1988) (defining employment
discrimination because of sex to include discrimination because of sexual orientation).
251. See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23.1006B(1) (West 1996) (prohibiting discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, disability, or national origin, but not sexual
orientation); N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 (McKinney 1993) (proscribing discrimination in
employment on the basis of "age, race, creed, color, national origin, sex, or disability,
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thermore, as the court in Rogers v. EEOC 52 noted, the "relationship
between an employee and his working environment is of such significance as to be entitled to statutory protection. 253 Thus, sexual harassment should be addressed at the federal level in order to ensure
that all employees have the right to work in an environment free from
abusive sexual conduct.
C. Sexual Harassment Legislation

Federal legislation prohibiting sexual harassment should be en-

acted 254 in order to protect individuals from sexual harassment that

does not constitute sex-based discrimination within the meaning of Title VII. 55 Although a broad statute focusing only on harassment
would include harassment cases currently covered by Title VII, the
legislation would simply provide an alternate theory for individuals
whose claims fit under both statutes. 6 Those victims who do not
or marital status," but not on the basis of sexual orientation); see also Clinton Pledges
Support for Legislation to Ban Sexual Orientation Discrimination, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 204, at A-1 (Oct. 23, 1995) (quoting a letter from President Clinton to
Senator Edward Kennedy that noted that "discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 'is currently legal in 41 states'.... 'Men and women in those states may be fired
from their jobs solely because of their sexual orientation .... and have no legal
recourse").
252. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
253. IL at 238.
254. The enactment of sexual harassment legislation would be within Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause, which typically has included regulation of a wide
spectrum of workplace behavior, ranging from workplace safety, e.g., the Occupational Safety Hazard Act, to discrimination, e.g., Title VII. See Suzanne Sangree, Title
VII ProhibitionsAgainst Hostile Environment Sex Harassment and the First Amendment: No Collision in Sight, 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 461, 484 (1995) (discussing Congress's
"wide powers" under the Commerce Clause to regulate forms of coercion and competition in the workplace); Dawn M. Buff, Note, Beyond the Court'sStandard Response:
Creating an Effective Test for Determining Hostile Work Environment Harassment
Under Title VII, 24 Stetson L. Rev. 719, 720 n.13 (1995) (noting that Congress has the
power to regulate anything affecting interstate commerce, and as a result, has the
power to regulate discriminatory practices in the workplace); see also 110 Cong. Rec.
6548 (1964) ("The constitutional basis for title VII is, of course, the commerce clause.
The courts have held time and again that the commerce clause authorizes Congress to
enact legislation which affects interstate and foreign commerce.") (statement of Rep.
Humphrey).
255. See Theodore F. Claypoole, Note, Inadequaciesin Civil Rights Law: The Need
for Sexual HarassmentLegislation, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 1151, 1166-69 (1987) (concluding
that legislation that regulates sexual harassment in the workplace should be enacted);
Peirce, supra note 49, at 1100-01 (proposing that sexual harassment legislation would
be the "ideal alternative").
256. A plaintiff could plead both theories, and the court could fashion an appropriate and fair, non-duplicative remedy based on the facts of the case. Thus, the overlap
between the legislation and Title VII would be similar to the overlap between Title
VII and §§ 1981 and 1983. See Headley v. Bacon, 828 F.2d 1272, 1274 (8th Cir. 1987)
(noting that Title VII and §§ 1982, 1983, and 1985 "simply permit recovery for various
injuries arising out of the same wrong or series of wrongs"); see also Leon Friedman,
Relationship Between Title VII, Section 1981, 1983, ADEA, the Equal Pay Act and
State Causes of Action for Employment Discrimination, ALI-ABA Course of Study
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have protection under Title VII, however, could pursue a claim under
the sexual harassment legislation.
The legislation's focus will be on the sexual behavior at issue, and
the effect on the victim's workplace environment. Primarily, the legislation will avoid determinations based on the sexual orientation of the
harasser through the elimination of the "but-for" requirement. 25
Although evaluation of sexual harassment claims under the new legislation would otherwise remain consistent with Title VII analysis, the
legislation also will address obstacles that unreasonably impede the
establishment of sexual harassment claims under Title VII through a
reconsideration of Title VII standards.
1. Analysis of Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment
Claims Under Title VII
In order to establish a claim of hostile work environment sexual
harassment under Title VII, a plaintiff must prove several elements.
First, a plaintiff must establish membership in a protected class, which
is fulfilled with the stipulation that the plaintiff is a man or a woman.1 8 The plaintiff must also demonstrate that the harassment
would not have occurred but for his or her sex.259 This requirement
establishes that the harassment was in fact discriminatory, and results
in the preclusion of certain forms of sexual harassment from Title
VII's protection. Additionally, the plaintiff must establish that the
harassment was unwelcome ° and "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to
alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abuMaterials 539,551-52 (1996), available in Westlaw, CA35 ALI-ABA 539 (outlining the
overlap between Title VII and §§ 1981 and 1983 and noting the advantages of bringing a case on both theories).
The sexual harassment legislation would be an attractive option for plaintiffs who
possess causes of action under the statute and Title VII because the plaintiffs would
not have to establish discrimination based on sex. Specifically, they would not have to
fulfill the "but-for" requirement that exists under Title VII. See infra part IV.C.2.a
(proposing elimination of the "but-for" requirement under the sexual harassment legislation). In addition, unwelcomeness would be an affirmative defense for the defendant to raise and prove, rather than an element of the plaintiff's prima facie case. See
infra notes 283-85 and accompanying text (suggesting that unwelcomeness would be
an affirmative defense under the sexual harassment legislation).
257. This analysis will focus only on hostile work environment claims. The evaluation of quid pro quo claims is more straightforward, requiring only the grant of an
economic benefit in exchange for submitting to a supervisor's sexual demands, or the
denial of job benefits because of the refusal to submit to the sexual demands. See
supra note 103. These requirements would remain the same under new legislation.
258. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982).
259. Id at 903-04.
260. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) ("The gravamen of
any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were 'unwelcome.'"
(citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985))). Such a determination is made "in light of 'the
record as a whole' and 'the totality of circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual
advances and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred.'" Id. at 69 (quoting
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1985)).
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sive working environment. ' '2 6 ' In addition, the work environment

must be one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, as
well as one that the victim subjectively perceived as abusive.262 Finally, in order to state263
a claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must establish employer liability.
2. Analysis of Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment
Claims Under Sexual Harassment Legislation
Similarly, under sexual harassment legislation, severe or pervasive
sexual conduct that unreasonably alters the work environment will
constitute an impermissible hostile work environment. Additionally,
the standards for employer liability will remain unchanged. Thus, an
employer will be liable for its own acts, as well as those of its agents or
supervisory employees, regardless of the employer's knowledge or endorsement of such acts.264 When a fellow non-supervisory employee
perpetrates the harassment, the employer will be responsible if the
employer knew or should have known of such conduct, unless the employer took immediate and appropriate remedial steps.2 65 In these instances, knowledge will be imputed to the employer if any of its agents
or supervisory employees had knowledge of the harassment. 66 Furthermore, an employer may be held liable even if the harasser is a
non-employee.2 67 Employer liability will be premised on whether the
employer knew or should have known of the conduct, and whether
the employer took reasonable steps to end the harassment.2 68 In this
context, the extent of the employer's control or legal responsibility
over the non-employee harasser would be relevant.2 69
261. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc. 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at
67). The Supreme Court further elaborated relevant factors for analysis of sexual
harassment claims, including "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance;
and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." Id. at
23. Psychological harm of the victim is relevant to the analysis, but is neither required
nor determinative. Id.
262. Id at 21-22.
263. Henson, 682 F.2d at 905. Employer liability can be established by showing
either that the employer provided no procedural mechanism to address complaints,
Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., 957 F.2d 59, 63 (2d Cir. 1992), or that the
employer knew of or should have known of the harassment, but failed to take remedial steps to end the harassment. Id.; Hardy v. Fleming Food Cos., No. Civ. A. H-943759, 1996 WL 145463, at *15 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 1996).
264. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1995).
265. See id. § 1604.11(d).
266. See id.
267. See id. § 1604.11(e).
268. See id.
269. See id.

1996]

BEYOND SEX DISCRIMINATION
a. Elimination of the "But-For" Requirement

Federal legislation prohibiting sexual harassment should track the

language of the EEOC Guidelines' section regarding sexual harassment.2 70 By tracking the Guidelines' language, the legislation will focus on the sexual nature of the conduct, rather than on the sex of the
parties or the motivation for the harassment. Thus, the legislation will
prohibit harassment based on sexual orientation, as well as harassment based on any other motive.
Accordingly, the legislation will eliminate the "but-for" requirement that normally accompanies sexual harassment analysis. 2 7 1 As a
result, a plaintiff will need to show simply that he or she was subjected
to conduct of a sexual nature and that
(1) submission to such conduct [was] made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual [was] used
as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or
(3) such conduct [had] the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment. 272

Sexual conduct will be defined to include "sexual advances, requests
for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual na-

ture.217 3 In determining the validity of a claim, the emphasis will be

on the sexual nature of the conduct and the resulting effect on the

individual's work environment, 74 without regard to the sexes or sexual orientations of the parties.
b.

Reconceptualizing the Standards of Sexual Harassment Claims

Although the standards of sexual harassment claims will remain rel-

atively unchanged, the application of the standards should be reformulated in order to more effectively protect against sexual

harassment. The reformulation will focus on removing unreasonable
impediments to claims of sexual harassment. For instance, fli
determining whether harassment rises to the level of unreasonably interfering with the work environment, the severe or pervasive standard will
continue to be used for analysis.2 75 The severe or pervasive require270. See 29 CY.R. § 1604.11 (1995). For the relevant text of the Guidelines, see
infra text accompanying notes 272-73.
271. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing the -but-for" requirement as an element of Title VII sexual harassment analysis).
272. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1995).
273. 1&
274. The legislation will emphasize the effect on the work environment, not the
effect on the plaintiff's emotional stability. Although a plaintiff could offer evidence
of psychological harm to demonstrate the effect of the harassment, such a showing
would not be required to establish a sexual harassment claim.
275. See Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (listing severe or
pervasive harassment as an element of a Title VII claim).
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ment, as currently construed, however, presents an obstacle that is unreasonably difficult for plaintiffs to overcome in all but the most
extreme cases.2 76

Thus, the interpretation of these requirements

should be reexamined.
The requirement, as the Supreme Court has framed it,2 77 suggests
an inverse ratio of severity and pervasiveness-the more severe the
conduct, the less pervasive it must be, and vice versa.278 Seemingly
trivial behavior, if regular enough, would constitute sexual harassment.279 Courts have suggested this reasoning, 280 but such an approach has not been consistently applied in practice.2 8 ' Therefore,
greater consideration must be given to the severe or pervasive standard in the analysis of sexual harassment claims, rather than the imposition of a severe and pervasive requirement in order to establish a
claim of sexual harassment. In addition, beyond a certain threshold
level, evidence of severity or pervasiveness could be a factor in the
determination of damages. 28

Furthermore, under the sexual harassment legislation, the unwelcomeness requirement will be reformulated as an affirmative de276. See Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 813, 843-47 (1991) (asserting
that the courts' application of an objective test that does not reflect what the plaintiff
finds pervasive renders the pervasive requirement difficult to meet); George, supra
note 107, at 20 (noting the "difficulties of establishing pervasiveness").
277. See Meritor,477 U.S. at 67 (1986).
278. George, supra note 107, at 21 ("[T]he more offensive a remark or the greater a
discrepancy in treatment, the less frequently the conduct would have to occur to be
actionable.... Triviality alone would no longer be a defense if the behavior were
regular, ongoing, and discriminatory.").
279. See id.
280. See, e.g., Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 578 (2d Cir.
1989) ("It is not how long the.., conduct lasts.... The offensiveness of the individual
actions complained of is also a factor to be considered in determining whether such
actions are pervasive").
281. See Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., 957 F.2d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1992)
("The incidents must be repeated and continuous; isolated acts or occasional episodes
will not merit relief."); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986)
(stating that quid pro quo sexual harassment "may evolve from a single incident,"
whereas hostile work environment sexual harassment is "characterized by multiple
and varied combinations and frequencies of offensive exposures" and requires the
plaintiff to "demonstrate that the injury resulted not from a single or isolated offensive incident, comment, or conduct, but from incidents, comments, or conduct that
occurred with some frequency"), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Parrish v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., No. 89-C-4515, 1990 WL 165611, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 1990)
("Although a single act can be enough to make a case of sexual harassment, generally,
repeated incidents create a stronger claim of hostile environment, with the intensity of
those incidents."); see also George, supra note 107, at 20 & nn.108-09 (discussing the
divergent results of sexual harassment claims due to the courts' disagreement as to the
necessary combination of nature and severity of conduct that will constitute sexual
harassment).

282. See Oshige, supra note 77, at 592-93 (arguing that plaintiffs should only have to
prove that harassment (1) was because of gender, (2) treated men and women differently, and (3) reflected "invidious stereotypes about women," and pervasiveness
should be only an element of damages).
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fense rather than an element of the plaintiff's claim -3 Requiring the
plaintiff to prove that he or she did not welcome the advances unfairly
places the focus on the victim's conduct.'
The initial assumption
would be that the victim did not welcome sexual conduct.'-5 Furthermore, evidence of the plaintiff's behavior should relate directly to the
cause of action. Therefore, only evidence "of specific words or gestures that reasonably encouraged or solicited in kind behavior" would
be admissible? -86 General behavior of the victim, for example his or
her mode of dress, would not be evidence that he or she welcomed the
harasser's conduct. Instead, the defendant will have to point to conduct that was directed at or involved him or her.
Thus conceived, the legislation will prohibit harassing sexual conduct without regard to the genders or the sexual orientations of the
parties. A heterosexual male who harasses a male will be held liable,
as will someone who sexually harasses another because the victim is
homosexual. As long as the conduct meets the requirements outlined
above, it will constitute sexual harassment. The emphasis will be
placed on the alleged harasser's behavior instead of on sexual preferences.' 7 As a result, those victims who cannot establish sex discrimination under Title VII will have protection from their abusive sexual
harassment. In addition, such an approach will continue to recognize
that many cases of sexual harassment in fact constitute discrimination
because of sex, and will not disrupt Title VII's protection of these
cases.
CONCLUSION

Ideally, Title VII should be amended to proscribe discrimination
based on sexual orientation. With such an amendment, sexual orientation harassment would be clearly prohibited, and same-sex sexual
harassment could be more easily regulated. In light of the fact that
such an amendment is unlikely, at least in the near future, the most
effective way to protect victims of harassment who fall outside of Title
VII's protection is to enact federal sexual harassment legislation. By
focusing on the conduct at issue rather than on discrimination, such
legislation would protect victims of sexual orientation and same-sex
sexual harassment. In addition, it would protect against equal oppor283. See George, supra note 107, at 28-30 (proposing to eliminate unwelcomeness
from the plaintiff's prima facie case); Oshige, supra note 77, at 590-92 (asserting that
the unwelcomeness requirement establishes too difficult a burden, discourages victims
from bringing claims, and thus, should be eliminated as an element of the plaintiffs
case).

284. George, supra note 107, at 29 ("The 'victim focus' effect of the unwelcomeness
criteria bears a sickening resemblance to what sometimes occurs in rape trials.").
285. See id. at 30 (suggesting that "the appropriate inference [is) that any sexual
conduct in the workplace is unwelcome").
286. Id.
287. Id at 28-30.
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tunity harassment and bisexual harassment, two forms of conduct that,
even with an amendment to Title VII, would fail to constitute discrimination based on sex, and thus would fall outside of Title VII's
protection.
Federal sexual harassment legislation would protect a broader
range of individuals from abusive sexual conduct, while leaving intact
the sexual harassment as sex discrimination framework that has developed into a powerful tool in the fight for women's equality. Thus, the
legislation would protect individuals from sexual harassment and continue the movement for equality that persists today.

